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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is concerned with examining the relationship between indicators of 
economic growth and environmental quality. During this process, the analysis explores and 
attempts to interlink the following theoretical and empirical frameworks: Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz’s theories for deforestation, the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis 
and the forest transition theory. Macro-level data are used to examine the implications of 
these frameworks. The implications of the first essay suggest that different crops have a 
different impact on rate of change of agricultural land use. The second analysis suggests that 
the results from a Directed Acyclical Graph Approach present a uni-directional causal 
relationship between income and pollution emissions. The third and final essay suggests that 
property rights structures and economic incentives appear to be the most probable 
explanations for the forest transition in India. The macro-level nature of the data sets 
employed provides information on the broad trends and patterns. For policy 
recommendations, a more detailed and specific analysis needs to be carried out concentrating 
on a certain region. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is divided into three essays. They are all concerned with 
environmental degradation at the macro level. The first essay examines the impact of 
the Green Revolution (GR) on the rate of change of agricultural extent. An increase in 
the agricultural area is considered to be a proxy for an increase in deforested area. The 
second essay is concerned with measuring the nature of causality between pollution and 
income in the context for the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The third and final 
essay is an examination of the forest transition in India; focusing on the possible role of 
two policies. 
 
Essay #1 The Impact of the Green Revolution on the Rate of Change of Land Use 
  This chapter examines the impact of the GR on the rate of change of agricultural 
land extent. The initial goal was to examine the effect of the GR on the rate of 
deforestation. However, due to the lack of reliable data, a change in the rate of 
agricultural extent is considered to be a proxy for a change in the rate of deforestation.  
The GR is defined as the complex combination of advanced agricultural 
technologies: (i) improved seed or planting materials; (ii) chemical fertilizers and (iii) 
irrigation. The impact of these changes on the forest cover is not clear. Various theories 
have been formulated to explain the impact of these changes. In this chapter we analyze 
the extent to which these alternative theories are consistent with the international data.   
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The first of these theories is known as the Borlaug Hypothesis, after Norman 
Borlaug who, along with others, has asserted that the GR could solve the problem of 
tropical deforestation by reducing the need for extensive agriculture as cereal demand 
increases rise (World Resources Institute 1986; Rudel and Horowitz 1993; Southgate 
1998; Rudel 2001). Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s (2001) theoretical framework derives 
the impact of various types of technological change on deforestation under differing 
market conditions. They find that the impact of technical change is not uniform. One of 
the implications of their model, tested in this analysis, is that the impact of technical 
progress is dependent upon the sector in which the change occurred. Technological 
change in the extensive sector generally leads to greater increases in deforestation when 
compared to the intensive sector.  
A positive sign for the coefficient of percent change in cereal yield per unit land, 
in the regression, provides support for the Borlaug hypothesis. It implies that significant 
increases in cereal yield per unit of land leads to land being released for other activities 
such as deforestation. Empirical support for Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s (2001) theory is 
provided if the impact of increases in rice yield is significantly lower than the impact of 
increases in wheat or maize yield. This is based on the premise that rice is a more labor-
intensive crop when compared to either wheat or maize. 
Using this theoretical structure and following Barbier’s (2001) empirical 
specification, we test for the effect of increases in rice, wheat and maize yields on 
agricultural extent. This effect is tested for in various specifications of the model. In the 
combined specification of the model, in which all countries are considered, little support 
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is found for Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s theory; the null hypothesis that rice yield has an 
equal or more positive impact on agricultural land extent is not rejected when compared 
to wheat yield in any of the specifications. Limited support is found for the Borlaug 
Hypothesis. 
 
Essay #2 Causality in the Context of the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
This chapter offers a methodological contribution in the analysis of causality 
within the context of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The inverted U-shaped 
hypothesis between various indicators of environmental degradation and income per 
capita, otherwise known as the EKC, has gained immense popularity over the past 
twenty years.  
The empirical analysis of the EKC relationship is usually provided by panel data 
methods where the two principle explanatory variables of interest are income and 
income squared. A possible drawback to such cross-country panel data methods is that a 
certain causal structure is implicitly assumed. Directed Acyclical Graphs (DAGs) is a 
method that reveals the underlying causality structure among the variables included in a 
regression, thereby helping overcome the problems of endogeneity in some models. 
Frequently employed techniques such as Granger causality tests are also computed to 
examine the causal structures between emissions and income. 
DAGs using directed edges provide a pictorial representation of all five 
relationships possible between any two variables X and Y. They are: there is no causal 
relationship; X causes Y; Y causes X; Y and X simultaneously cause each other; and the 
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causal relationship cannot be determined by the information provided (Wang and 
Bessler 2005). Relationships between any two variables considered in the regression are 
represented; therefore, it is possible to infer the causal link between variables included 
in a regression.  
The relationship between different emissions and income across the world is the 
focus of this analysis. The air pollutants of interest based on previous literature are 
sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide. Therefore, the regression models employed by Stern 
(2010) and Harbaugh et al. (2002) are replicated to understand the relationship between 
variables that are normally considered within an EKC analysis. 
In this chapter, we first review time series issues that are integral to establishing 
causality between variables; also we discuss how these issues have been dealt with 
within past EKC literature. We then use the DAG methodical framework to examine if 
it reveals any new insights into the causality between variables. We find that GDP per 
capita causes emissions in contemporaneous time. We then compare and contrast the 
results from this approach to results from Granger Causality (this approach is the effect 
of lagged values).  Both approaches combined are necessary to understand causality as 
defined by Hume. 
 
Essay #3 Examining the Role of the Social Forestry Program and the JFM 
Program in the Indian Forest Transition 
The third essay in this dissertation considers the forest transition process in India 
and evaluates two forestry programs that were designed to encourage the expansion of 
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forest lands in the country. The Forest Transition Theory (Angelsen 2007) predicts the 
various changes in forest cover over time. Four main stages are identified: (1) initially 
high forest cover and low deforestation; (2) accelerating and high deforestation; (3) 
slow-down of deforestation and forest cover stabilization; and (4) a period of 
reforestation (Angelsen 2007). 
According to Mather (2007), India has gone through a forest transition and has 
moved from net deforestation to net reforestation. Further, the percentage of land under 
forest has increased. Various theories to explain the forest transition have been 
proposed. The relative merit of each of these theories is explored within the context of 
the Indian forest transition. 
Historically, most of the forest in India is state owned; local populations have 
had historically little say in the management of these forests. Two schemes that have 
been instituted to promote greater participation by the locals are the Joint Forest 
Management scheme (JFM) and Social Forestry Program. The aim of this analysis is to 
examine the possible role of the Social Forestry and JFM programs in the Indian forest 
transition. The goal of the Social Forestry Program is to promote growth of forest 
products demanded by the local population on generally non-forest lands. The goal of 
the JFM scheme, on the other hand, is to promote greater community participation in the 
management of forest areas.  
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CHAPTER II  
THE IMPACT OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION ON THE RATE OF CHANGE OF 
LAND USE 
 
Introduction1 
The significant increases in agricultural productivity commonly known as the 
Green Revolution (GR) spread rapidly across developing countries in Asia and Latin 
America, and the resultant increases in food production pulled the region back from 
famine and led to regional food surpluses within 25 years. It led to a decline in poverty 
rates, made important contributions to economic growth in the region and transformed 
the nature of agricultural technology by improving inputs such as irrigation, seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides. It allowed countries to achieve self-sufficiency and food 
security (Hazell 2009). 
The GR in this context refers to a series of research, development and 
technology transfer initiatives that increased agriculture production around the world 
between the 1940s and the 1970s. More specifically, it refers to the introduction of high-
yielding seeds and the increased use of fertilizers and irrigation. This led to rapid 
increases in wheat and rice yields that, in turn, increased the per capita food availability 
and reduced the price of food staples (Hazell 2009). However, the environmental impact 
of the GR is difficult to comprehend. Of particular concern is the GR’s impact on the 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this manuscript was presented  as a poster at the American Environmental and 
Resource Economics Association’s Conference in Seattle June 2011 
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extent of agricultural land and, by extension, the effect on forest area. Various 
hypotheses have been formulated to predict the impact of this change in agricultural 
technology on tropical deforestation, the most notable being the Borlaug hypothesis; 
Norman Borlaug along with others believed that significant increases in the land 
productivity of cereals would lead to a decrease in tropical deforestation by reducing the 
need to expand the area of cultivated land as a demand for crops. Therefore, according 
to this argument, the GR saved large areas of forest wetlands and other fragile lands 
from conversion to cropping (Hazell 2009). 
However, a number of concerns have been raised about the possible 
environmental effects of the GR. According to (Cassman 1999), increases in 
agricultural productivity are primarily results of four technological advancements: 
improved germplasm, increased fertilizer use, double cropping and irrigation (Brady 
and Sohngen 2008). Increased fertilizer use and double cropping could have an adverse 
impact on soil fertility, leading to greater soil degradation, creating incentives for more 
extensive uses of land which eventually lead to land being cleared away for cropping.   
Furthermore, technological change does not always yield the same impact on 
agricultural area. As Angelsen and Kaimowitz (2001) show in their model, the intensity 
of the crop as well as the type of technological change is also of significance. The 
impact of these changes might not be uniform across all crops affected by the GR. The 
three crops that will be considered in this analysis are rice, wheat and maize. The labor 
intensities of these crops are different: rice production is far more labor intensive than 
either wheat or maize. Moreover, the intensities of inputs vary over time. 
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Objectives of this Study 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the nature of the relationship between 
rates of agricultural expansion and increasing agricultural productivity (a result of the 
GR) in certain developing countries in Asia and Latin America. The indirect goal is to 
study the impact of increased yields on deforestation. However, data on agricultural area 
appear to be more reliable than the data on forest area (Barbier 2001). Therefore, the 
direct goal of this study is to determine if the increases in agricultural yield that resulted 
from the GR led to a reduction in the land area dedicated to agriculture, freeing up land 
for alternative activities, where one of the alternate uses of this land could be forestry. 
The analysis will be carried out at the national level across countries in Asia and Latin 
America. 
 
Literature Review 
There are many deforestation studies that also examine the impact of agricultural 
progress on the forestry sector. These models are divided into analytical, simulation and 
empirical regression models (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999).  
The lack of reliable data in developing countries appears to be the main obstacle 
to empirical analyses of the impact of the GR on the forestry sector. Therefore, studies 
from developed countries are often used to provide insights into this phenomenon. 
Rudel (2001) finds evidence for the Borlaug Hypothesis in the American South, and 
similarities between developing and developed countries are drawn. These results are 
said to be general and can be extended to developing countries. Further empirical 
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support is provided by experiences across many of the developed countries. This has led 
to the formulation of the following transition theory: land transitions from forest to 
agricultural land due to deforestation; however, with the passage of time and increasing 
agricultural reforestation, only lands with the greatest agricultural potential are 
cultivated (Mather and Needle 1998).  
Jayasuriya (2001) finds that the relationship between technical progress and 
forest cover varies. His analysis is based on the Hecksher Ohlin framework, in which 
three types of land use are considered: upland agriculture, lowland agriculture and 
forest. The impact of technological progress on deforestation depends on the sector in 
which it occurs. He concludes that under certain market conditions, technical progress 
in the intensive sector encourages afforestation, whereas similar progress in the 
extensive sector could lead to greater deforestation.  
 The advances in cereal production due to the GR did not occur 
contemporaneously; technological progress was staggered across the different crops. 
Evenson and Gollin (2003) divide the GR era into two phases: the early GR (1961–
1980) and the late GR (1981–2000) periods. The early GR had the greatest impact on 
rice and wheat. The technologies associated with these two crops are different: rice 
cultivation is more intensive than wheat cultivation; returns to labor diminish more 
slowly for rice rather than for wheat (Vollrath 2011).  
When examining the effect of increased yields, one must control for variation in 
a number of other variables affecting deforestation. Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) 
base their model on a synthesis of a number of studies on deforestation. Their work, on 
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which we build on substantially in this chapter, divides the variables that affect 
deforestation into the immediate causes and underlying causes. Their immediate causes 
of deforestation are listed in table II.1. and the underlying causes are discussed at 
greater length in the paragraphs that follow the table. 
 
Population pressures 
With increases in population, the aggregate demand for a number of forest 
resources also increases. These resources include land, fuel wood, timber and other 
forest products; however, growing populations could also lead to technological progress 
and institutional change which contribute to reduced pressure on forests. Multi-country 
regression models find a positive correlation (e.g., Cropper and Griffiths (1994)) or no 
correlation, between population density and deforestation. The validity of the results 
from these studies is questioned by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999).  They object to the 
use of forest area data from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), which is 
considered to be unreliable. The FAO carries out forest resource assessments once every 
five years; estimates for intervening years are interpolated based on population data. 
This could be a potential source of endogeneity.  
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Table II.1. Major Results on Immediate Causes of Deforestation 
 Effect of increase in variable, by 
model type 
 
Variable Analytical         Simulation and 
empirical 
Comments 
Agricultural 
output prices 
Increase Increase Farm-level analytical mdels 
predict increase, unless there are 
strong income effects 
(subsistence models). 
Agricultural 
input prices 
Indeterminate Mixed Fertilizer price increases may 
induce shift to more land-
extensive systems. 
Off-farm wages 
and employment 
Reduce Reduce Among the most significant 
findings. 
Credit 
availability 
Indeterminate  Increase Depends on whether the relevant 
investment is forest 
clearing or forest management 
and agricultural intensification; 
most studies find that credit 
finances deforestation. 
Technological 
progress on 
frontier farms 
(direct effects) 
Indeterminate Little evidence Similar to price increase: new 
labor intensive technologies may 
reduce deforestation if labor 
supply is inelastic. 
Accessibility 
(roads) 
Increase Increase Among the most significant 
findings, although roads are 
partly endogenous. 
Homesteading 
property regime 
Increase Little evidence Claims to future land rents give 
farmers additional incentive to 
clear land. 
Land tenure 
security 
Indeterminate Increase Empirical evidence is relatively 
weak. 
Timber prices Indeterminate Increase Empirical evidence is relatively 
weak but tends to 
find a positive link 
Source: Table 2 in Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) pg 82 “Rethinking the causes of deforestation: 
lessons from economic models.” The World Bank Research Observer 14:73–98 reproduced with 
permission of the Oxford University Press. 
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Income level 
The impact of income on the forest extent is ambiguous. On one hand, higher 
national incomes provide nonagricultural or off-farm employment opportunities that can 
reduce the pressure on forest land. Increased incomes could also lead to greater 
awareness and desire to protect the forest. However, increased incomes also lead to an 
increase in demand for agricultural and forest products, which may result in increased 
deforestation (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999).  
  The EKC idea is extended to income and the rate of deforestation. A number of 
multi-country regression analyses have found empirical evidence for this hypothesis 
(Cropper and Griffiths 1994; Culas 2007; Bhattarai and Hammig 2001; Bhattarai and 
Hammig 2004). However, there are also studies that have found no such evidence 
(Koop and Tole 1999). 
  
External debt trade and structural adjustment 
Policies and institutional factors also have an impact on the forestry sector. 
Specifically, there is expected to be a positive relationship between external 
indebtedness and deforestation. In analytical models it is found that external 
indebtedness and structural adjustments increase deforestation (Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz 1999). Empirically, institutional factors are considered by Bhattarai and 
Hammig (2001) who include variables such as black market foreign exchange and debt, 
policies that are designed to encourage agricultural and food exports stimulate 
deforestation. Their model is estimated for Asia, Africa and Latin America. The sign for 
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the debt coefficient is found to have a positive and significant sign in all three 
estimations, whereas, black market foreign exchange is positive and significant only for 
Asia. 
 
The indirect effects of technical change 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the impact of this variable. A 
theoretical discussion of the results of technical change will be provided in greater detail 
in the theoretical review section of this chapter. Initial multi-country studies did control 
for the effect of agricultural progress, for example Bhattarai and Hammig (2001). Culas 
(2007) included an agricultural production index as well as a variable that measured 
agricultural trend, the index was insignificant with the inclusion of the institutional 
variable 
Barbier (2001) finds evidence that increases in cereal yield led to reductions in 
agricultural expansion. However, these results do not appear to be significant when 
indices measuring political stability, corruption and property rights are added. Barbier 
(2001) is also important because, rather than utilizing data on forest area, he uses data 
on agricultural area, which are considered to be more reliable.  
 
The Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used here is based on Angelsen and Kaimowitz 
(2001, AK hereafter). The mathematical details associated with this model are 
elaborated further in the appendix. The results derived from this model are presented in 
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table II.2. The authors consider the impact of three different types of technological 
progress on forest area: yield increasing technical progress (α), labor-intensive technical 
progress (β) and, labor-saving technical progress in the intensive sector (ε). Three types 
of parameters are utilized to represent the three types of technical change α, β, ε. An 
increase in the parameter, α, represents a pure yield increasing technological change; 
this is known as a Hicks neutral technological change because it does not affect the 
marginal rate of substitution between land and labor. The implications of a neutral 
technological change on the rate of deforestation are the same as a price increase in 
outputs. Examples of this form of technology progress include the introduction of 
higher yielding crops and pest-resistant varieties. 
An increase in the parameter β represents an increase in labor intensity. This 
technology is also termed land-saving technological change because it impacts the 
marginal rates of substitution positively; a smaller quantity of labor can be substituted 
for a unit of land. As well as increasing the yields per acre, this type of technological 
change also tends to increase the labor employed per acre of land. With this type of 
technological change, effective labor becomes relatively cheaper when compared to 
land. The farmer, therefore, tends to employ larger amounts of labor. 
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Table II.2. Impact of Technological Progress on Agricultural Land Extent 
  Subsistence 
model with 
imperfect 
markets 
Farm model 
with perfect 
markets 
Macro 
model with 
endogenous 
wages 
Macro 
model with 
endogenous 
prices 
Type of 
technological 
progress (t.p.) 
Pure yield 
increasing t.p. in 
intensive sector (α) 
NA NA 
Decrease Decrease 
Labor intensive t.p. 
in intensive sector 
(β) 
NA NA 
Decrease Decrease 
Labor saving t.p. in 
intensive sector (ε) 
NA NA 
Increase Decrease 
Pure yield 
increasing t.p. in 
extensive sector (α) 
Decrease Increase Increase Not known 
Labor intensive t.p. 
in extensive sector 
(β) 
Decrease No effect Decrease Decrease 
Labor saving t.p. in 
extensive sector (ε) No effect Increase Increase Not known 
NA– not applicable. In the first two models, the agricultural sector is not divided into the intensive and 
extensive sectors.  
Source: Table 6.2 Angelsen and Kaimowitz (2001), pg. 102 in “When does technological change in 
agriculture promote deforestation?” D. R. Lee and C. B. Barret, eds. in Tradeoffs or synergies?: 
agricultural intensification, economic development and the environment reproduced with the permission 
of CAB International, Wallingford, U.K. 
 
  
The application of greater capital inputs leads to an increase in the parameter ε. 
This type of technological change is termed as labor-saving technological progress and 
decreases the amount of time required to accomplish a certain task, which typically leads 
to displacement of labor. This could, for example, be the use of tractors, which may be 
cheaper to invest in rather than labor. Agricultural labor may now find that a 
 16 
 
nonagricultural activity might provide them with better wages. Therefore, labor is 
diverted towards these activities. 
The effect of changes in these parameters and their implications on the agricultural 
extent were derived and analyzed under four settings of consumer preferences and market 
conditions by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (2001). Two of their models are microeconomic 
in nature: the subsistence and the open economy models. The remainder macroeconomic: 
the endogenous wage and price models. The objective of the farm model and the 
macroeconomic models is to maximize profit, whereas, the objective of the subsistence 
model is to minimize effort. In the macroeconomic models, the agricultural area is divided 
into two: the intensive and the extensive sectors. Moreover, when compared to the farm 
model, the market conditions are not perfect; in one scenario the wages are endogenously 
determined, and in the other prices are endogenously determined.  
Table II.2 summarizes theoretical results of the models, which the authors 
suggest might be empirically tested.The AK model implies that technological change in 
the intensive sector almost uniformly leads to the conservation of forests. Moreover, 
characteristics of the labor and the product markets involved do not seem to matter 
except for the case labor-saving technology which expels labor to the extensive sector. 
The magnitude of this effect depends on market conditions. For example, according to 
Southgate (1998), in the US, increases in opportunities of work in other sectors reduced 
the supply of agricultural labor; this generated a contraction of the area used to raise 
cattle and livestock (AK 2001). More specifically, with respect to the GR, AK has 
observed that introduction of high-yielding rice varieties and fertilizers in Asia have led 
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to the conservation of forests in these areas. The large increases in rice production are 
said to have depressed rice prices, which in turn prevented families from expanding 
their food crops into forested areas. Coxhead and Shively (1995) test this theory using a 
computable general equilibrium model. They find evidence that yield improvements in 
maize can depress food prices, which in turn should reduce forest clearing for maize and 
rain-fed rice irrigation crops (AK 2001). In the empirical model tested below, rice crops 
will be considered as the intensive sector, whereas maize and wheat crops will be 
considered as the extensive sector  
The effects of technological change in the extensive sector are mixed. In a 
subsistence economy, technological progress decreases deforestation. However, when 
the labor market is not constrained and the farmers are profit maximizing, technological 
change will increase deforestation. This prediction of the AK model will be tested by 
including rice trade, wheat trade and maize trade variables, where trade in crops will be 
regarded as a measure of the openness of the economy. 
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Empirical Section 
The insights derived from the theoretical model will be tested using macro-level 
data across countries in Latin America and Asia. The specification of the empirical 
model is based on that used by Barbier (2001). This extension of Barbier’s specification 
attempts to test for differences in the effect of technological change between the 
intensive and extensive sectors. The specific empirical hypotheses tested and their 
connections to the theoretical model will be discussed subsequent to the presentation of 
the empirical model. Table II.3 provides a brief description of and summary statistics 
for the variables included in this analysis. 
The empirical model is summarized in equation II.1, where the dependent 
variable is the rate of change of agricultural extent and the independent variables are 
those related to the theoretical model proposed by AK: 
(II.1)   ΔAit2 = βc +βRY RYit+βWY WYit  +β𝑀𝑌MYit + βPGDP PGDPit+βPGDP2 PGDP
2
it +
βPPGDP PPGDPit + βCRPLCRPLit + βPPONPPONit + β ARPPARPP  it + βRITR   RITRit +
βWHTR   WHTRit + βMATR MATRit+Uit3 
where the index i refers to a country and t refers to the year. Definitions for all 
variables are listed in table II.3. 
                                                 
2 It is implicitly assumed that the direction of causation is unidirectional from yields to areas. This 
assumption is not tested. It is based on previous literature and more particularly Barbier’s (2001) 
specification. 
3 Uit refers to the error term. This term contains information on variables not included in the model. In 
this instance these could be various socio-economic indicators that have been considered in other 
empirical EKC studies. However, in this instance, information on these indicators is difficult to obtain 
from the 1960’s. 
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Table II.3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A Arable land in km 
 
672 8.86E+05 1.26E+06 1.81E+04 5.34E+06 
RY 
Rice yield per 
hectare in Hg 
 
672 3.56E+04 1.51E+04 1.29E+04 7.90E+04 
WY 
Wheat yield per 
hectare in Hg 
 
672 1.84E+04 9.79E+03 4.24E+03 5.23E+04 
MY 
Maize yield per 
hectare in Hg 
 
672 2.05E+04 1.27E+04 3.28E+03 7.67E+04 
PGDP 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US 
$) (centered data) 
 
672 -2.20E-05 1.33E+03 -4.99E+03 9.29E+03 
PGDPS 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 
US$ squared) 
672 1.75E+06 7.35E+06 1.63E-02 8.63E+07 
PPGDP 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
672 2.55E+00 4.40E+00 -2.64E+01 1.88E+01 
CRPL 
Permanent 
cropland (% of 
land area) 
672 1.51E+00 1.54E+00 1.25E-01 8.80E+00 
PPON 
Annual percentage 
change in 
population 
672 1.97E+00 7.68E-01 -1.02E+00 3.44E+00 
ARPP 
Arable land 
(hectares per 
person) 
672 2.76E-01 2.18E-01 3.20E-02 1.10E+00 
RITR 
Rice export value 
US$ div. by inc. 
US$*10000 
667 1.60E+00 3.57E+00 0.00E+00 2.42E+01 
WHTR 
Wheat export 
value US$ divided 
by income 
 
 
  
income 
US$*10000 
667 6.53E-01 1.97E+00 0.00E+00 1.42E+01 
MATR 
Maize export 
value US$ divided 
by income 
US$*10000 
667 7.39E-01 2.25E+00 0.00E+00 2.32E+01 
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Empirically Testable Hypotheses 
 
(1) Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s extensive versus intensive land use hypothesis 
The theoretical model provides several empirically testable hypotheses. Each of 
these hypotheses has been given their own name. First, the main result that emerges 
from AK’s theoretical model is that the more labor intensive the production of a crop is, 
the lower the impact of technological change on agricultural expansion. Since wheat and 
maize are considered to be less labor intensive than rice, the model suggests that the 
coefficients of wheat yield and maize yield should be significantly greater than the 
coefficient of rice yield. This leads to our first testable hypothesis: 
H1:βMY and βWY > βRY, 
where, βMY, βWY and βRY are the coefficients of wheat, maize and rice.  
This hypothesis is derived from the theoretical model and is based on the results 
from table II.3, where it is apparent that all forms of technological progress in the 
intensive sector, except for labor-saving technological progress in the case of models 
with endogenous wages, lead to a decrease in the extent of agricultural area.  
(2) Borlaug hypothesis  
Second, if the Borlaug effect is observed in the data, then we would expect the 
regression coefficient on rice, wheat and maize to be negative. This would imply that 
increase in yields has led to a reduction in the expansion of agricultural area. Hence, the 
Borlaug hypothesis can be stated formally as: 
H2:βMY , βWY, and βRY < 0. 
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(3) Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s profit maximization versus subsistence goal hypotheses 
Another result from the theoretical model is that the more export feasible a good, 
the greater its positive impact on the rate of agricultural expansion. This result is based 
on the comparison of columns in table II.2, where the effect of technological progress 
on deforestation in all the market models is positive when compared to the subsistence 
model. We use trade volumes as indicators of a move away from the substance model 
towards the market model. 
To isolate this affect, we include a trade index that measures the feasibility of 
trade of the crop. This leads to two related hypotheses.  First, we can test 
H3: βRITR ,βWHTR,βMATR > 0 
where, βRITR , βWHTR, and βMATR are the coefficients on the export value relative to the 
nation’s income for rice, wheat and maize respectively.   
Further, the index of volume of trade of certain crop can be considered to be an 
indicator of the openness of the market of the crop. Hence, based on comparison of the 
columns in table II.2, it should follow that the effect on agricultural land expansion will 
be strongest for those crops with a higher trade index. This leads to our last testable 
hypothesis: 
 H4: βRITR > βWHTR > βMATR,   provided rice trade >wheat trade >maize trade. 
Testing for each of the hypotheses should lead to better understanding of the 
interlink ages between the theoretical and the empirical frameworks. Specifically, it will 
provide an empirical test of Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s (2001) theoretical prediction 
that a more labor-intensive crop such as rice has less pronounced impact on agricultural 
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expansion when compared to a less intensive crop such as wheat or maize, or the 
Borlaug hypothesis which states that technological progress promotes afforestation. To 
isolate the impact of increases in crop yields on the rate of agricultural expansion one 
must control for underlying factors that affect deforestation such as population 
pressures, income levels, trade and structural change. 
 
Data  
The variables considered in this study are mostly the same as those used by 
Barbier4 (2001) and control for the underlying causes of deforestation. To control for 
population pressures, percentage change in population is considered, to control for 
income effects, variables such as annual per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita and 
GDP per capita squared are included. Finally, the indirect effects of technical change in 
agriculture are controlled for by considering yields of the various agricultural crops. In 
addition, variables such as percentage of land area under permanent crop and arable 
land per capita are also included. Rice, wheat, and maize exports and imports have been 
used to control for the openness of the economy. 
All variables are annual from 1961 to 2008.  The income variables, population 
variables and the data on agricultural land extent, arable land per person and percentage 
                                                 
4 The variables considered by Barbier is a representation of synthesis model specification. According to 
Barbier a synthesis model is an integration of four types of models: Environmental Kuznets Curve 
analysis, competing land use models, forest land conversion models and institutional analysis. Data on 
institutional variables are often difficult to obtain. 
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of area under permanent crops are all part of the 2011 World Bank5 Indicator data 
series. Percentage change in agricultural extent is calculated from the data on 
agricultural extent. The income data are in terms of per capita in constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars. Both GDP growth and population growth are in terms of annual percent change, 
cropland share of land is percent of total area and, finally, arable land per person is in 
terms of arable hectares per person. 
Data on individual crops, which include rice, wheat and maize, are accessed from 
the FAOSTAT6 website. The data include information on yields( FAOSTAT(2013)a) and 
exports, imports (FAOSTAT (2013)b) and production of these crops. Yields of the 
different crops are in terms of Hg/Ha. A trade index for each of the crops is created by 
dividing export value of each of the crops by income. The list of countries selected is 
based on Hazell’s (2009) list of countries in Asia and Evenson and Gollin’s (2003) study 
of the GR. The countries included in Asia are Bangladesh, China, India, South Korea, and 
Pakistan. And those included in the Latin American model are Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay. A combined 
model including 14 countries from both regions is also specified. Graphs of yields of the 
three crops and rate of change of agricultural area considered over time are presented 
below. Only a small number of countries grow all three crops, which is why the number 
of countries considered in this analysis is not large.  
                                                 
5  Last accessed website on 24th May 2014 from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators/wdi-2011. Data accessed in December 2012 
6 Last  accessed  website on 24th May 2014 from FAOSTAT2013a 
(http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor) and FAOSTAT 2013b  
(.http://faostat.fao.org/site/535/default.aspx#ancor) Data accessed in December 2013. 
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The data series contains observations for 48–50 years across 14 countries in 
Latin America and Asia. The number of time periods, T, is larger than the number of 
countries, indicating that normal panel data methods might not be suitable. This sort of 
data series is known as time-series cross-section data. In a time series cross-section 
1data set there are 20–50 observations over time on 10–100 units, unlike a panel data 
series in which there a larger number of countries and fewer time periods (Beck and 
Katz 1995). Figure II.1. represents rice yields across the 14 countries. 
 
 
 
Figure II.1. Rice Yields (Hg/Ha) 
 
 
 
Figure II.2. represents wheat yields across the 14 countries. 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
R
ic
e 
Y
ie
ld
H
G
/H
A
Year
Argentina
Bangladesh
Brazil
China
Colombia
Ecuador
Guatemala
India
 South Korea
Mexico
Pakisthan
Paraguay
Peru
Uraguay
 25 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure II.2. Wheat Yields (Hg/Ha) 
 
 
Figure II.3. represents maize yields across the 14 countries. 
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Figure II.3. Maize Yields (Hg/Ha) 
 
 
Figure II.4 represents the agricultural area across the 14 countries. 
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Figure II.4. Percentage Change in Agricultural Extent 
 
 
Methodology 
The relatively long time span of the data suggests that we must test for time-
series properties such as stationarity. Non-stationarity of the data series could lead to 
spurious regressions and erroneous conclusions. Panel data methods that are generally 
employed in this area such as the fixed-effects estimator do not account for the non-
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stationary nature of the data. These methods are generally appropriate for data where 
the time span of the series is short and the number of countries sampled is large. 
  
Stationarity and cointegration tests 
In tables II.4 and II.5 we present the results of stationarity tests for all variables 
used. Table II.4 presents the results for the variables that come from a balanced panel, 
while table II. 5 presents test statistics for the variables that are unbalanced. The lag 
length for each series was based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), 
automatically computed for the Levin Lin Chu (LLC, 2002) test and the Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (IPS, 2003). 
In table II.4 we present the results of the test LLC, the Breitung (2000) and the 
IPS stationarity tests. Greater details on each of these tests are provided in appendix 
A.II.. In each of these tests the null hypothesis is that the data are non-stationarity. All 
three tests are carried out since there are slight variations in each of these tests. The test 
statistics for the variables are presented for three groups of countries, all countries 
combined, just the Asian countries and just the Latin American countries. These 
variations have been elaborated on further in appendix A.II.. For a variable to be 
stationary, the null hypothesis should be rejected; the p-values associated with each of 
the tests are presented in tables II.4 and II.5. The choice for the LLC and IPS statistics 
are based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
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Table II.4. Stationarity Tests (H0: The Variable is Non-stationary, i.e., The Panels 
Possess at Least One Unit Root) 
  Combined Asia Latin America 
  LLC IPS Breitung LLC IPS Breitung LLC IPS Breitung 
RY 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.539 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
WY 0.034 0.830 1.000 0.280 0.920 1.000 0.001 0.557 0.427 
MY 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ARPP 0.000 0.000 0.958 0.000 0.000 0.988 0.000 0.164 0.661 
CRPL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.998 
PGDP 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.587 0.997 1.000 
𝐏𝐆𝐃𝐏𝟐 1.000 1.000 0.005 1.000 1.000 0.061 0.999 0.887 0.054 
PPGDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PPON 0.968 0.994 0.757 0.949 0.974 0.168 0.941 0.955 0.999 
RITR  0.000  0.916 0.000 0.138  0.000  
WHTR  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.362  
MATR  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.054  0.000  
PAGR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: RY- Rice yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per 
hectare in Hg; MY- Maize yield per hectare in Hg; ARPP- Arable land (hectares per person; CRPL -
Permanent cropland (% of land area); PGDP-GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) (centered) data; 
PGDP2 -GDP per capita(constant 2000 US $) squared; PPGDP- GDP per capita growth (annual %); 
PPON- Annual percentage change in population; RITR Rice export value US$ divided by income: 
WHTR- Wheat export value US$ divided by income; MHTR- Maize export value US$ divided by 
income. 
 
 
 
Table II.4 presents the results of the LLC, IPS and the Breitung tests. Both the 
LLC and Breitung tests can only be carried out for balanced data. However, the trade 
indices in the combined and Latin American models are unbalanced. Therefore, only 
IPS statistics are available for these variables in table II.4. Hence, in table II.5 the Fisher 
test statistic is also presented, which is also compatible with unbalanced data. The 
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choice of lag length for the IPS and LLC statistics is based on the BIC criteria. The lag 
length for the Breitung test is based on the lag length for the LLC statistic 
. 
Table II.5. Stationarity Tests Using Fisher’s Statistic (H0: The Variable is Non- 
stationary, i.e., The Panels Possess at Least One Unit Root) 
  Combined Asia 
Latin 
America 
RITR 0.000 0.020 0.000 
WHTR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MATR 0.000 0.000 0.023 
 
Notes: RITR Rice export value US$ divided by income: WHTR- Wheat export value US$ divided by 
income; MHTR- Maize export value US$ divided by income 
 
 
 
 
Based on the results in table II.4 and table II.5, for most variables we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. The variables that appear to be stationary 
across models are the percentage change in agricultural area (PAGR) and percentage 
change in GDP (PPGDP).  The trade indices RITR, MATR are stationary for the 
combined and Latin American models at the five percent level of significance. Whereas, 
the WHTR, the wheat trade index is stationary for the Asian and combined models. 
The LLC and IPS tests in general indicate that arable land per person (ARPP) is 
stationary, however, the results of Breitung tests do not allow for the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity, this result is robust to lag specification. PGDP2 is 
found to be stationary on the basis of the  Breitung test; however, the  LLC and IPS tests 
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fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, therefore this variable is also 
assumed to be non-stationary. 
A method that accounts for the non-stationary nature of the data is the error-
correction model. In order to apply the error-correction method, the data must be 
cointegrated. That is, a linear combination of the non-stationary variables must be 
stationary. Hence, we now turn to three cointegration tests whose results are presented 
in tables II.6, II.7 and II.8. The details associated with each of the cointegration tests 
carried out are also included in appendix A.II..  
The variables included in the two tests of cointegration are once again rice yield 
(RY), wheat yield (WY),  population growth ( PPON), maize yield (MY), per capita 
GDP (PGDP) and cropland area (CRPL). Though, the variable Per Capita GDP squared 
(PGDP2) is not stationary, it is not included in the cointegration test. The results of the 
Westerlund tests are presented in table II.6. The null hypothesis for these tests states that 
there is no cointegration amongst the variables. This method is based on error-
correction models. 
The results from the Westerlund test in table II.6 give no clear indication as to 
whether the variables are cointigrated or not. The Westerlund test is very sensitive to the 
specification of the test7. Bootstrapping is performed to provide a robust value. 
However, the values obtained continue to be sensitive to the specification of the model. 
                                                 
7 For lags and leads greater than one, none of the Westerlund statistics reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegartion. The AIC criterion may be used for choice of lag length; however, in this specification, it 
always led to the maximal lag length.  
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The panel statistic, Pt and the group statistic Gt, provide evidence that the variables are 
cointegrated across the combined and the Asian at the 10% level. The null hypothesis of 
no cointegration cannot be rejected for any statistics for the Latin American 
specification. 
These tests do not provide a clear indication of whether the variables are 
cointegrated or not; therefore, additional tests for cointegration, the Kao (1999) and 
Pedroni (1999)8 tests, are performed.  The results of these tests are presented in tables 
II.7 and II.8. As seen in table II.7. below, a majority of the Pedroni statistics do not 
support the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the five percent level of confidence. 
 
Table II.6. Westerlund Cointegration Tests (H0: The Variables are not Cointegrated.) 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Robust  
P-value 
 
Combined      
Gt -3.594 -1.708 0.044 0.001  
Ga -9.874 4.389 1.000 0.728  
Pt -12.593 -1.549 0.061 0.063  
Pa -8.453 3.603 1.000   0.755  
Latin America       
Gt -3.078 0.302 0.619 0.175  
Ga -10.514 3.321 1.000 0.693  
Pt -9.751 -0.894 0.186 0.118  
Pa -7.729   3.116 0.999 0.823  
Asia      
Gt -4.524 -3.263 0.001 0.000  
Ga -8.722 2.889 0.998 0.650  
Pt -8.480 -1.885 0.030 0.021  
Pa -11.298 1.487 0.931   0.131  
                                                 
8 The power of these tests is often questioned since they make an assumption of common factor (McCarl 
et al. 2009). 
 33 
 
Only the “panel V statistic” supports the null hypothesis of no cointegration across the 
three models. For the Latin American estimation, five out of the seven statistics reject 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the five percent level of significance. 
 
Table II.7. Pedroni Cointegration Test (H0: The Variables are not Cointegrated) 
  Constant   Constant & Trend 
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Combined 
  
  
Panel v-Statistic -3.12 0.999 -4.72 1.00 
Panel rho-Statistic -4.68 0.00 -2.73 0.00 
Panel PP-Statistic -17.06 0.00 -19.11 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -15.68 `0.00 -15.84 0.00 
Group rho-Statistic -3.05 0.00 -1.85 0.03 
Group PP-Statistic -18.71 0.00 -22.33 0.00 
Group ADF-Statistic -13.06 0.00 -12.72 0.00 
Latin America 
    
Panel v-Statistic -2.69 0.999 -3.97 1.00 
Panel rho-Statistic -3.80 0.00 -2.17 0.02 
Panel PP-Statistic -14.02 0.00 -16.08 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -12.78 0.00 -12.96 0.00 
Group rho-Statistic -1.34 0.09 -0.60 0.27 
Group PP-Statistic -10.03 0.00 -16.20 0.00 
Group ADF -8.10 0.00 -8.10 0.00 
Asia 
 
    
Panel v-Statistic -0.89 0.81 -1.95 0.97 
Panel rho-Statistic -2.59 0.01 1.75 0.04 
Panel PP-Statistic -8.66 0.00 -8.63 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -8.34 0.00 -8.23 0.00 
Group rho-Statistic -3.31 0.00 -2.28 0.01 
Group PP-Statistic -17.85 0.00 -15.64 0.00 
Group ADF-Statistic -10.99 0.00 -10.42 0.00 
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Further evidence for cointigration is provided by the results from Kao’s 
cointegration test that are presented table II.8.  Kao’s cointegration test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration for all specifications of the model. Both the Pedroni as 
well as the Kao statistics provide evidence against the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. Kao’s test allows for the inclusion of more than six variables, therefore 
all trade indices and Arable land per person (ARPP) variables are included in the test. 
After reviewing all of the above tests, we conclude that even though the results 
of the Westerlund cointegration results were inconclusive or in the case of the Latin 
American model did not support a hypothesis of no cointegration, a large number of 
statistics that make up the Pedroni test and the Kao reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration, suggesting evidence in favor of the variables being cointegrated. On the 
basis of this result, the error-correction method, which we now discuss, can be 
employed to estimate the model. 
 
Table II.8. Kao Cointegration Tests (H0: The Variables are not Cointegrated.) 
    Statistic Prob 
Combined 
  
ADF 
 
-8.07 0.00 
Latin America 
  
ADF 
 
-6.14 0.00 
Asia 
   
ADF 
 
-7.27 0.00 
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The error correction model 
In an error correction model, it is assumed that there is a long- run relationship 
between the dependent variable Y and the independent variable X. The basic structure 
of the error-correction model may be represented by the following equation, II.2.  
(II.2)  ΔYt = α + βΔXt−1 + ECt−1 + εt.     
The term EC measures the speed at which the deviations from the equilibrium are 
corrected. This model provides us with a method of measuring both the short-term and 
long-term impacts of X on Y, and also a method to measure deviations from the mean 
(Best 2008). 
The particular form of error-correction model utilized in this estimation is based 
on Blackburne and Frank (2007).The basic idea behind the error-correction model is 
that the error term is corrected for by utilizing error terms from the past. This approach 
was proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1997, 1999) in (Blackburne and Frank 
2007). Martinez–Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho (2004) provide techniques to 
estimate non-stationary dynamic panels and have found applications in the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve analysis (Blackburne and Frank 2007). 
These authors assume that there exists an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) specification represented by the following equation, II.3: 
(II.3)   yit = ∑ λijyit−j
p
j=1 + ∑ δij
′q
j=0 xi,t−j + μi + εit.     
Where the groups are i=1,2……..N,  
t=1………….T  is the number of periods, 
Xij is the 𝑘 × 1 vector of explanatory variables, 
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𝛿𝑖𝑗 are the 𝑘 × 1 coefficient vectors, 
𝜆𝑖𝑗 are scalars and, 
𝜇𝑗 is the group specific effect, and  
εit  are the error terms (Blackburne and Frank 2007). 
This model is then respecified as an error-correction model by using the following 
equation, II.4: 
(II.4)  Δyit = Φi(yi,t−1 − θi
′ xit) + ∑ λij
∗p−1
j=1 Δyi,t−1 + ∑ δ
q−1
j=1 ij
′
Δxi,t−j + μi + εit.  
Equation 11.4 is a specific instance of general error correction form represented by 
equation II.2. 
There has been widespread use of these mean group (MG) and pooled mean 
group (PMG) models to time-series cross-section data in the recent past. Evidence of a 
long-run relationship is provided if ΦI  is significant and negative. The term θi
′
  is of 
interest since it represents the long-run relationship between the variables. Three 
methods of estimation can be used to estimate the above model (Blackburne and Frank 
2007): these are the fixed effects estimation method, the pooled mean group estimation 
method and the mean group method.  
For this analysis, the pooled mean group estimation method is utilized. In the 
fixed effects estimation approach only the intercepts are allowed to vary across groups. 
However, if the slope coefficients are not identical, the fixed effects estimator could 
lead to misleading results. The mean group estimation on the other hand allows both 
intercepts and slopes, and error variances to vary across groups.  
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The pooled mean group estimation method is a compromise between the fixed 
effects estimator and the mean group estimator. This method combines both pooling and 
averaging; it allows the short-run coefficients and error variances to vary across groups, 
but the long-run coefficients are held to be equal across groups. The PMG method 
utilizes the maximum likelihood estimation method to estimate the coefficients 
(Blackburne and Frank 2007). The PMG model is the only method that is used in this 
analysis. Equation II.9 is nonlinear in parameters; the maximum likelihood is 
considered to be the most appropriate method to estimate the model (McCarl et al. 
2009). 
 
Results 
Tables II. 9 and II.10 present the results of the long-run and short-run estimates 
of the error-correction model, respectively. The focus of the analysis in this chapter is to 
examine the effect of increases in yields of different crops, rice, wheat and maize (RY, 
WY, MY in the long run, and DRY, DWY and DMY in the short run), on land area in 
agriculture. The long-run coefficients (table II.10.) of rice and wheat yields are negative 
and significant for the combined and Asian specifications. Maize yield (MY) is found to 
be negative and significant in the case of the Latin American specification. Maize yield 
has a negative effect on expansion of agricultural land use in the short run. 
The income variables per capita GDP, per capita GDP squared and percentage 
change in GDP (PGDP, PGDP2,  PPGDP)  are  also generally found to be respectively 
negatively and positively significant, for the combined and Asian specifications; in the 
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case of the Latin American specification (table II.9.), the effect of PGDP is positive. 
These variables are associated with the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). 
The measure for population growth (PPON) is found to positive and significant 
in the long run for the combined and Asian specifications this result is as expected 
based on previous theoretical and empirical literature (Barbier 2001, Cropper and 
Griffiths 1994). The sign of population growth is negative for the combined model.  
The structural variables are arable land per person (ARPP) and percentage of 
land area under permanent crops (CRPL). ARPP when significant is positive for the 
Asian and combined specifications. The coefficient for CRPL surprisingly is found to 
be negative in the case of the Latin American specification. In the short run (table II.10), 
the coefficient of arable land per person (DARPP) is found to be positive and significant 
across all specifications. 
The trade variables do not generally appear to be significant either in the short 
run or the long run except in the case of wheat trade in the short run (DWHTR), which 
is positive and significant in the case of Latin American specification. The sign is as 
expected. 
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Table II.9. Estimates from the Error Correction Specification (Long-Run 
Relationship) 
 Combined 
Latin 
America Asia 
RY -1.78E-07*** -3.95E-08 -2.20E-07*** 
 (0.00) (0.49) (0.00) 
WY -1.20E-07* 5.80E-08 -1.65E-07** 
 (0.06) (0.37) (0.01) 
MY 7.73E-08* -1.49E-07*** 1.27E-07** 
 (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) 
ARPP 0.045398*** 0.003511 0.049385*** 
 (0.00) (0.73) (0.00) 
CRPL 0.001094 -0.01491*** 0.002408*** 
 (0.24) (0.00) (0.02) 
PGDP -1.04E-06*** 1.61E-06*** -8.87E-07*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
𝐏𝐆𝐃𝐏𝟐 3.94E-11 -7.96E-11 4.90E-11 
 (0.20) (0.70) (0.13) 
PPGDP 0.000468*** -0.00022 0.000405** 
 (0.00) (0.81) (0.02) 
RITR 2.49E-05 -4.1E-05 -7.1E-05 
 (0.86) (0.56) (0.62) 
WHTR 0.000185 0.000371* -0.00034 
 (0.82) (0.07) (0.70) 
MATR -7E-05 -0.00018 -0.00161 
 (0.93) (0.84) (0.21) 
PPON 0.007287*** -0.0007 0.008812*** 
  (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) 
Likelihood 2500.535 1468.638 1061.49 
Sample 
size 641 411 230 
 
Notes: RY- Rice yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per 
hectare in Hg; MY- Maize yield per hectare in Hg; ARPP- Arable land (hectares per person; CRPL -
Permanent cropland (% of land area); PGDP-GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) (centered) data; 
PGDP2 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $) squared; PPGDP- GDP per capita growth (annual %); 
PPON- Annual percentage change in population; RITR- Rice export value US$ divided by income; 
WHTR- Wheat export value US$ divided by income; MHTR- Maize export value US$ divided by income 
***- significant at the one percent level **- significant at the five percent level    
*- significant at the ten percent level. The values in parentheses, in the above table II.9., are p values. 
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Table II.10. Short Run Coefficients from the Error Correction Models (Short-Run 
Relationship)  
  Combined Latin America Asia 
ec -0.74167*** -0.71345*** -0.94889*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DRY 9.19E-09 7.32E-10 1.78E-08 
 (0.96) (0.998) (0.89) 
DWY 4.11E-07 4.80E-07 -4.30E-08 
 (0.56) (0.63) (0.76) 
DMY -9.07E-07** -1.24E-06* -2.61E-07*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.00) 
DARPP 2.943657*** 0.901428** 6.606396** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
DCRPL 0.001315 -0.06981 0.024915*** 
 (0.98) (0.41) (0.00) 
DPGDP -7.7E-05** -1.1E-05 -0.00016** 
 (0.02) (0.72) (0.01) 
DPGDPS -3.20E-08 5.33E-08 -2.24E-07 
 (0.74) (0.12) (0.56) 
DPPGDP -0.00011 -2.6E-05 4.96E-05 
 (0.62) (0.94) (0.53) 
DRITR 0.00349 0.00567 -0.00052 
 (0.29) (0.23) (0.17) 
DWHTR -0.15474 -1.01144 0.519285 
 (0.83) (0.50) (0.63) 
DMATR 0.002403 0.00705 -0.01447 
 (0.83) (0.62) (0.13) 
DPPON -0.0357 -0.02379 0.00113 
 (0.21) (0.42) (0.39) 
 
Notes ec-error correction term DRY- Short run rice yield per hectare in Hg; DWY- Short run wheat yield 
per hectare in Hg; DMY-  Short run maize yield per hectare in Hg; DARPP- Short run Arable land 
(hectares per person; DCRPL- Short run Permanent cropland (% of land area); DPGDP- Short run GDP 
per capita(constant 2000 US$) (centered)data;  DPGDPS- Short run per capita (constant 2000 US $) 
squared;  DPPGDP- Short run GDP per capita growth (annual %); DPPON- Short run Annual percentage 
change in population;  DRITR Short run Rice export value US$ divided by income; DWHTR- Short run 
Wheat export value US$ divided by income; DMHTR- Short run Maize export value US$ divided by 
income. 
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Discussion of Empirical Support for Each Specific Hypothesis 
 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s intensive versus extensive land use hypothesis 
Table II.11. presents results that can be used to test if there is evidence that 
intensive land use has a lower impact on rate of agricultural land expansion than 
extensive land use.  We test whether the coefficients of rice yield, a relatively more 
labor-intensive crop, are lower than those of wheat and maize yield, relatively less 
labor-intensive crops. The motivation for this hypothesis is basically derived from the 
comparison of the darker section (results associated with the intensive sector) with the 
lighter section (results associated with the extensive section) in table II.2. The numbers 
in table II.11 represent the p-values associated with each of the null-hypothesis tests. 
The tests employed to compare the differences between coefficients are Wald tests. 
 
Table II.11. Test of Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s Intensive and Extensive Land Use 
Hypothesis 
Null Hypothesis tested Combined Latin America Asia 
RY≥WY 
0.2679 
0.1302 
0.2996 
RY ≥MY 
0.0016*** 
0.9678 
0.0002*** 
RY=MY=WY 
0.0079*** 
0.0072*** 
0.0004*** 
MY=WY 
0.0301** 
0.0050*** 
0.0024*** 
Notes: RY- Rice yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per hectare in Hg WY- Wheat yield per 
hectare in Hg; MY- Maize yield per hectare in Hg. 
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Table II.11 does not provide much empirical support for Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz’s 2001 hypothesis; the coefficient of rice yield (RY) is found to be 
significantly lower in value than maize yield (MY) across the combined and Asian 
models. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of rice yield 
(RY) is greater than that of wheat yield (WY) for any of the specifications. When we 
test the joint hypothesis that the long run yield coefficients (RY, WY, MY) are all equal, 
we are able to reject this hypothesis at the 10 % level of significance for all the 
specifications. Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s 2001 land use hypothesis states the 
coefficient of rice yield should be lower than that of either maize or wheat because rice 
is a more labor-intensive crop. 
 Further, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of maize yield (MY) is 
less than the coefficient of rice yield (RY) for the Latin American specification.  
 
Borlaug hypothesis 
Empirical support for the Borlaug hypothesis in this framework is provided 
when the coefficients of rice yield, wheat yield and maize yield (RY, WY and MY or 
DRY, DWY and DMY) are found to be negative and significant. This result differs 
across the crops. Rice and wheat yields support the Borlaug Hypothesis in the case of 
combined and Latin American models. In the case of the Latin American models, maize 
yield supports the Borlaug Hypothesis. Barbier (2001) also finds evidence that supports 
this hypothesis. However in his specification, cereal yields are considered as whole and 
are not broken into individual crops. 
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Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s open market hypothesis 
There is not much empirical support found for Angelsen and Kaimowitz’ 
2001open market hypothesis. The coefficients of trade for the three crops appear to be 
insignificant (RITR, MATR, WHTR and DRITR, DMATR and DWHTR) in both the 
long run as well as the short run in most of the specifications. 
  
Summary and Conclusions  
One of the contributions of this study has been its focus on the effect of 
increases in agricultural production on the rate of expansion of agricultural land. The 
theoretical basis for this focus is provided by Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s (2001) 
theoretical framework and the Borlaug hypothesis, and their theoretical model has been 
evaluated empirically. By looking at the yields of several crops, we attempt to capture 
the differences in the effect of technical progress in the intensive and extensive sectors. 
The findings of this study indicate that while there is not much empirical support for 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s theoretical framework, there is some support for the Borlaug 
hypothesis. 
The analysis in this chapter is most similar to studies that examine empirical 
evidence for an EKC for deforestation (Bhattarai and Hammig 2001, Culas 2007). 
However, the focus of those studies is not usually on the impact of agricultural yields, 
so not much attention has been paid to the Borlaug hypothesis. Barbier’s (2001) 
specification on which the empirical model is based on, finds empirical evidence that 
supports the Borlaug hypothesis—his coefficient for cereal yield is found to be negative 
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and significant. Our results differ when the effects of cereal yields are decomposed into 
the different crops. Yield increases in some crops do not appear to be consistent with the 
Borlaug hypothesis. 
Another contribution of this chapter is the integration of theoretical and 
empirical literature on factors that affect deforestation. We build on Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz’s frameworks to understand the differentiation between immediate and 
underlying factors that affect specifically deforestation and, more generally, land use. 
These underlying factors have been controlled in the EKC literature; however, Angelsen 
and Kaimowitz (1999)’s study differentiates these factors that affect deforestation into 
immediate and underlying causes. The variables included in the analysis are measures 
for the underlying causes rather than immediate causes of deforestation. These 
variables, based on the results of the error-correction model, are found to be significant 
in the long run rather than in the short run. 
The methodological contribution of this literature is to account for the non-
stationary nature of the variables by utilizing an error-correction model.  There is 
evidence that the data are cointegrated, on the basis of the Pedroni and Kao test, and, 
therefore, there is a long run relationship amongst the variables considered.  The error-
correction model also provides short run and long run effects, and these short run effects 
could possibly be differentiated into immediate and underlying causes. 
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CHAPTER III  
CAUSALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE 
(EKC) 
 
Introduction 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is a hypothesized U-shaped 
relationship between various estimators of environmental degradation and income per 
capita (Barbier 1997, Stern 2004). With the availability of pollution data, empirical 
verifications of the EKC hypothesis have become widespread.  
One of the main reasons the EKC hypothesis has generated so much attention is 
it provides an alternative to Ehrlich and Holdren’s (1971) I=PAT ( I = impact, 
P=population, A=Affluence, T=technology) equation, which relates impact (pollution) 
to population, affluence and technology. This equation forms the basis for both books 
The Population Bomb and The Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972). 
According to the IPAT equation, population and increasing affluence are the main 
sources of environmental degradation; the effect of technology is assumed to be neutral. 
If an EKC-type relationship holds on the other hand, then economic growth might have 
a positive impact on the environment in the long run. Both the IPAT equation and the 
EKC hypothesis raise the question, “Does economic development need to slow down to 
avoid harm to the environment?” (Carson 2010).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
There are many theoretical models to explain the dynamics behind the U-shaped 
curve of an EKC type model. Andreoni and Levinson (2001) explain the micro-
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foundation of the EKC relationship; according to them, the shape of the curve depends 
on increasing returns in the technological link between consumption of a desired good 
and abatement of its undesirable byproduct. This argument supports the theory that 
technologies could provide a solution to environmental degradation. However, their 
theory does not support the idea that economic growth is necessary to reduce 
environmental degradation, since the authors find that technology is not influenced by 
either growth or institutional structures. Therefore, there is no strong theoretical support 
for the EKC. Another explanation that has been offered to explain the EKC is increasing 
returns to the abatement of pollution. Empirical support for the EKC is most commonly 
provided by regression models, an alternative method that has been proposed to be the 
generation of decomposition and efficient frontier models. The main empirical insight 
that can be gained is that pollution does not necessarily increase with economic growth 
(Andreoni and Levinson 2001). 
As noted by Carson (2010), one of the main problems with empirical 
verifications of the EKC is the difficulty in proving causality. This is a part of the larger 
problem of not taking into account time-series properties of the data series. Many of the 
initial empirical specifications are based on reduced-form equations; the drawback of 
using reduced-form equations is that a certain causality structure is implicit. Very often 
the econometric properties of a series are ignored; issues that are usually of concern in 
an empirical study of the EKC are heteroskedasticity, simultaneity, omitted variable 
bias and cointegration issues (Stern 2004). These issues could all lead to problems in 
specifying the causal structure between variables. Many of the prominent initial 
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empirical studies of the EKC use panel data, and most of these data are non-stationary; 
it is then extremely difficult to establish causality since statistically significant 
coefficients might be a result of spurious correlation rather than a causal relationship 
between the variables. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine causality within the context of the 
EKC. Non-stationarity of a time series poses a problem in establishing the direction of 
causation between the variables, therefore testing for stationarity and cointegration and 
related topics will be discussed, both generally and within the context of the EKC. 
Methods employed to establish causality such as the Granger causality and the Directed 
Acyclical Graph (DAG) approach will be explored, with greater emphasis on the latter 
approach; the insights gained from these two approaches will be compared and 
contrasted. Finally, both methods will be employed to test for causality between income 
per capita and pollution emissions in three well-known data sets. 
The next section provides some background on basic time-series concepts. 
These concepts form the framework for discussing causality within the time-series 
domain. This discussion primarily draws upon the standard work by Dolado et al. 
(1990).  
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Stationarity9 
Stationarity of a time series refers to the invariance property of the time series. 
Econometricians are primarily interested in stationary time series since non-stationary 
series could lead to spurious regressions. According to Yule (1926), if two series are 
growing over time, they can be correlated even if increments in each of these series are 
uncorrelated. Specifically, Granger and Newbold (1974) have explored these ideas of 
non-stationarity and shown that it can lead to spurious regressions (Dolado et al. 1990). 
Hence, understanding stationarity is a necessary first step in the process of unraveling 
causal relations in time-series data. 
Two working definitions of stationarity are normally employed: first-order 
(strong stationarity) and second-order (weak stationarity). A time series {xt} is said to 
be strictly first-order stationary if for any finite sequence of integers t1,…,tk  and shift h, 
the distribution of the original and any shifted time series are the same. The time series 
is said to be weakly stationary or second-order stationary if the mean is constant for all 
t, and if for any t and k, the covariance between xt and xt+k only depends on the lag k. 
In other words, there exists a function such that, for all t and k (Subbarao 2008),  
(III.1)   c(k) = Cov(xt, xt+k).       
For example, a random walk represented by equation III.2 (Perman 2013),  
(III.2)  xt = xt−1 + εt,         
is an instance of a non-stationary process.  
                                                 
9 This section provides an overview of standard principles of time-series analysis. The section draws 
heavily on Dolado et al. (1990). 
 49 
 
The expectation and variance of x𝑡 are   
(III.3)   E(xt) = x0 and var(xt ) = tσ
2.      
Variance  is dependent on time, meaning that the series does not satisfy the 
invariance property required of stationary series. An autoregressive representation of a 
time series is represented by equation III.4. 
(III.4)   xt= c +∑ 𝜑𝑖xt−i
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡.       
A test for the presence of unit roots for an autoregressive representation of a 
time series is a test for stationarity. The Dickey Fuller test is based on this principle. 
Other tests employed include the Augmented Dickey Fuller test and the Phillips Pherron 
test (Dolado et al. 1990). 
The Dickey Fuller (DF) statistic is used to test if a pure autoregressive AR (1) 
process has a unit root. Consider the following time series: where 𝜀𝑡 is white noise, t is a 
time trend and the initial value x0 is assumed to be known. Assuming without loss of 
generality that x0 = 0, the data generating process for xt can be written as 
(III.5)   xt=β0+β1t +ρxt−1+εt.       
The test for stationarity is testing the null hypothesis of non stationarity  H0:ρ =1 versus 
the alternate hypothesis of stationarity H1 :ρ <1, 
(III.6)   ∆xt=β0+β1t +Υxt−1+εt,  
where H0:ρ =1 is equivalent to H0:Υ =0 since Υ = ρ − 1.The test is implemented 
through the usual t-statistic of γ (Dolado et al. 1990).   
 50 
 
For the Dickey Fuller test, it is assumed that the data generating process was an 
AR (1) process. However, in the case of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) statistic 
we assume that we have an AR (p) process, which is denoted by equation III.7. 
(III.7)   ∆xt=β0+β1t +Υ1xt−1+∑ Υ2i
p−1
i=1 ∆xt−i + εt.  
An alternative approach based upon the DF procedure is presented by Phillips 
(1987) and Perron and Phillips (1987). The ADF statistics are based upon the 
assumption that the disturbance term εt is identically and independently distributed; 
they suggest amending these statistics to allow for weak dependence and heterogeneity 
in εt. Under such general conditions, a wide class of data-generating processes can exist 
for εt; most order Autoregressive Moving Average Process (ARIMA) models are 
allowed (Dolado et al. 1990).  
There are many studies that implement the augmented Dickey Fuller test in the 
context of the EKC (Soytas et al. 2007, Ang 2007). These studies are usually confined 
to a single country; most of these studies find that income and other variables normally 
included in an EKC analysis are non-stationary. 
The above tests have also been modified for panel data in EKC studies. Two 
prominent studies in this area are Perman and Stern (2003) and Dinda and Coondoo 
(2006). They both use panel versions of the augmented Dickey Fuller test. Perman and 
Stern (2003) concentrate on sulfur dioxide emissions and find that income and sulfur 
dioxide emissions are both non-stationary. The focus of Dinda and Coondoo’s (2006) 
work is on the relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and income. They also 
find the income and carbon emissions series are non-stationary.  
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The Problems with Non-Stationarity 
The results of classical econometric theory are based on the assumption of 
stationarity. Hence, the standard techniques are no longer valid when the data are non-
stationary. 
In the specific context of the EKC, non-stationarity of a data series means that a 
regression analysis could find that there is a relationship between income and pollution 
emissions when there is in fact none. Perman and Stern (2003), in their cross-sectional 
panel study of countries across the world, found that both sulfur emissions and income 
show stochastic trends. How this arises is discussed below. Consider, for example, a 
regression of income on emissions and we get the result in equation III.8, 
(III.8)  Log (emissionst)= 12.35 -0.095  log percapita income at timet)+ut 
     (2.05) (6.05)  R2=0.68 
where the numbers in parentheses are the associated t values, both of which state that 
the coefficients  are significant at the five percent level. 
The above model might look plausible. However, the regression is spurious if 
the residuals of the regression, ut, are not stationary (Nielsen 2005). When this is true, 
the results associated with the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are no longer 
reliable or valid and could lead to an erroneous conclusion that per capita income has an 
impact on pollution emissions. 
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An Integrated Series 
Integration is closely related to the concept of stationarity; an integrated series is 
a non-stationary series that can be transformed into a stationary series by differencing. 
Box and Jenkins (1970) proved that there exists a stationary transformation of this class 
of non-stationary series that is achieved by successive differentiation. The order of 
integration refers to the number of differences that need to be applied to a time series 
before it becomes stationary.  
To avoid finding spurious correlations, an integrated series needs to be 
differenced to make it stationary. Many of the data series in the EKC literature are 
integrated of order one; therefore, first differencing the data yields a stationary series. 
Taking logs and first differencing the data is the transformation that is normally applied. 
Perman and Stern (2003) found in their study that the income and sulfur dioxide 
variables are integrated of order one. Other studies have found this level of integration 
for income and other variables.  
  
Cointegration 
Existence of a cointegrating relationship ensures that there is Granger causality 
in at least in one direction; it indicates a long run equilibrium between two series that is 
supported by economic theory. Cointegration between pollution emissions and income 
provides evidence of a causal relationship. 
Even when a pair of time series is not stationary, sometimes a linear 
combination of them is stationary. When this is true, the pair of series is said to be 
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cointegrated. If two time series, xt and yt, are cointegrated, then one series causes the 
other; moreover, any pair of cointegrated series will have an error-correction model 
representation (Johansen and Juselius 1990). The error-correction form is represented 
by equation III.9, 
(III.9)   Dxt = ∑ Γi
k−1
i=1 Dxt−1+ΠYt−1+εt (Haigh and Bessler 2004),                                    
where D represents the first difference operator and εt  is the random “disturbance” 
term. 
Further, if the two series, yt  and xt, have the same order of integration, in most 
cases any linear combination of these two series will also have the same order of 
integration. However, if there is a linear combination of the series that is integrated of a 
lower order, then the pair of series is cointegrated at the lower order of the linear 
combination. Economic theory then suggests the long-run relationship between the two 
time series, yt and xt, can be represented by equation III.10.  
(III.10)  yt=α-βxt + zt−1.    
Note that the term zt−1 in equation III.10 represents the difference between the 
two series in the previous period (Dolado et al. 1990). In the context of the EKC, 
cointegration tests have often failed to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration.  
Perman and Stern (2003) use cointegration analysis to test for a long-run relationship 
between sulfur dioxide emissions and per capita income across 74 countries and for a 
time period of 31 years. They find that the data contain a linear trend and are, therefore, 
non-stationary. To identify a causal EKC relationship, therefore, they need evidence that 
the income and emissions cointegrate. The individual regressions they carry out provide 
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no evidence of such a relationship. Therefore, they do not find an EKC relationship for 
sulfur emissions. Stern (2004) provides examples of other studies which also find no 
evidence of cointegration. For example, Day and Grafton (2003) test for cointegration, 
using a Canadian time series; they find they cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration (Stern 2004).  
Normal cointegration tests assume that the order of integration between 
variables is an integer. However, fractional integration relaxes this assumption and 
allows both the order of integration as well as the order of cointegration to be a fraction. 
Initial studies using traditional panel cointegration tests showed that the carbon dioxide 
emissions series and the income series were not cointegrated. Therefore, a long-run 
causality relationship could not be established between the variables. However, when 
Galeotti et al. (2009) carried out a fractional cointegration study, they found that carbon 
dioxide emissions and income were cointegrated in the long run. 
Another approach, often used within the EKC literature to test for cointegration 
between the variables is the autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL), represented 
by equation III.11. 
(III.11)   yt = β0 + β1yt−1 … + βkyt−p + a0xt + a1xt−1 + ⋯ … . . +aqxt−q + εt, 
where εt is a random "disturbance" term. A bounds test is used to test for the presence of 
a long-run equilibrium between the variables. This approach has an advantage over 
others; it can be employed when there is a mixture of both stationary and non-stationary 
variables (Giles 2012). It is frequently used within the pollution context to study the 
relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and GDP per capita. These studies 
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generally find evidence of a long-run relationship between carbon dioxide emissions 
and GDP per capita. Examples include Martinez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho 
(2004), Soytas et al. (2007) and Iwata et al. (2010). 
 
Causality 
The definition of causality provided by Hume is the basis of many of the 
empirical tests for causality.  Hume defines causality as follows: 
"We may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, 
and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects 
similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object has not 
been, the second never had existed” (Hume 1748, Sect. VII, part II) in 
Kwon and Bessler (2011). 
 
The above statement provides two definitions of causality. These two definitions 
might be represented by the two probability statements, III.12 and III.13: 
(III.12) P (A|B) >P(A), and  
(III.13)  P (A|BC) =0.  
The second statement is the basis for the counterfactual or the manipulative 
concept of causality. Consider a situation in which event A is rain and event B is 
lightning. Event Bc refers to the situation where there is no lightning. We can see that 
the presence of lightning might well increase the chances of rain; but there can be rain 
without lightning. Therefore, the second statement, III.13, would not be valid. However, 
if the first statement is used to define causality, the conclusion would be that lightning 
causes rain. Consider another situation, where event A is again rain and event B is the 
appearance of clouds. Now both statements are satisfied, and we would conclude that 
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clouds cause rain. Probability statement III.13 is, therefore, a stronger definition of 
causality. Granger causality is primarily based on the first statement and provides a test 
of probabilistic causality for time-series data.  
Holland (1986) has defined an empirical test of causality, based on the second 
statement or the manipulative concept of causality. However, Holland’s definition is for 
experimental rather than observational data (Kwon and Bessler 2011). A method that 
attempts to provide empirical tests for causation for both non-temporal and non-
experimental data is the graphical causal approach; this method is elaborated further 
following the discussion on Granger causality. Alternative approaches to causality 
within economics might be represented by table III.1. These approaches, on one hand, 
may either emphasize structure or process or, on the other hand, may rely on either a 
priori identifying assumptions or seek to infer causes from the data (Hoover 2008). 
Regressions, often used to provide empirical support for the EKC hypothesis, 
usually employ the a priori approach. Granger causality, on the other hand, is a process 
inferential approach. It is based on empirical information, and there is no direct 
reference to background theory. The DAG theory does not fit solely into one of the cells 
given above; it is an inferential approach which straddles both cells on the inferential 
row in table III.1 (Hoover 2008).   
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Table III.1. Approaches to Modeling Causality in Economics 
 Structural Process 
Apriori Cowles Commission 
Koopmans (1950) 
Hood and Koopmans 
(1953) 
Zellner(1979) 
Inferential Simon (1953) 
Hoover (1990, 2001) 
Ferraro experiments 
Granger (1969) 
Vector auto regressions 
Sims (1980) 
Source: Figure 1 Kevin Hoover (2008) Pg. 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Edited by 
Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This 
material may not be copied or reproduced without permission from Palgrave Macmillan 
 
 
 
 
Granger Causality 
Assume we have three time series  xt , yt  and wt, and want to establish the 
causal relationship between the series xt and yt given wt .We first attempt to forecast 
yt+1 using  xt, yt  controlling for wt. We then consider all three variables, xt, wt and yt, 
in predicting xt+1. If the second forecast is more successful than the first forecast, then 
we can conclude that y contains some information not contained in the past values of x 
and w, which helps in forecasting xt+1. wt does not have to be a single variable; it could 
be the vector of all the explanatory variables or controls. The accuracy of the assertion 
that yt causes xt, is dependent on the size and stringency of wt. 
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Granger causality might also be defined as: 
(III.14)  xt Granger causes yt+1 If P (yt+1| all information dated t and earlier) 
≠ P(yt+1 | all information dated t and earlier omitting information about x) (Hoover 
2008). 
The test for Granger causality uses the vector autoregression (VAR) model. The 
VAR model is the generalization of the autoregression model. It is represented by 
equation III .15: 
(III.15)  xt =A1xt−1+A2xt−2+……….Apxt−p+εt.    
 To test for Granger causality we consider the bivariate VAR in equation III.16, 
(III.16) (xt
yt
) =  ∑ [
α11i α12i
α21i α22i
]
p
i=1 (
xt−i
yt−i
).   
The variable xt is said to not Granger cause yt if and only if  α12i =0, i = 1,2 … p this 
result is said to hold for both integrated as well as stationary processes (Luetkepohl 
2011). 
According to Engle and Granger (1987), if a pair of series is cointegrated, it can 
be said there is a causal relation or Granger causality in at least one direction. However, 
if there is a Granger causal relationship, it does not imply that the series are 
cointegrated. 
While the Granger causality test has been utilized to understand the nature of 
causality between variables, the results from this approach are often questioned. The 
Granger causality approach is based on the ability of one variable to predict the other 
variable. The second definition of causality is based on manipulation. Variable y causes 
variable x only if values of x can be changed by changing values of y. One of the 
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drawbacks of using Granger causality is that it does not fully address causality from the 
manipulation perspective (Kwon and Bessler 2011).  
Structural causality neither implies Granger causality nor is implied by Granger 
causality (Hoover 2008); it is also insufficient to solve the identification problem and is 
finally sensitive to the information problem (Kwon and Bessler 2011). Previous studies 
have used Granger causality to determine the direction of causation between income and 
pollution emissions (e.g., Perman and Stern 2003). Income is often found to be non-
stationary or integrated. For there to be a causal relationship, the variables considered 
must be either stationary or cointegrated. There is not too much statistical evidence 
supporting causality in EKC-type relationships. It is not possible to use the results of the 
Granger causality test to determine if a long-run equilibrium between income and 
pollution emissions exists. Therefore, we cannot infer that changes in income lead to 
changes in pollution emissions (Carson 2010). Coondoo and Dinda (2002) test for 
Granger causality between carbon dioxide and income at the global level. First, their 
study reveals that for developed country groups of North America and Western Europe, 
carbon emissions Granger cause income. Secondly, for the country groups of Central 
and South America, Oceania and Japan, income Granger causes emissions. Finally, for 
country groups in Asia and Africa the causality is bi-directional. Income and emission 
growth rates reinforce each other. As mentioned earlier, no conclusions can be reached 
about the long-run relationship between income and emissions. 
The studies cited so far, Perman and Stern (2003) and Coondoo and Dinda 
(2002), are panel-level studies. Within the EKC context, Granger causality is frequently 
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employed to study the relationship between carbon dioxide, energy use and emissions 
for a single region (e.g., Soytas et al. 2007); these studies find that energy use Granger 
causes emissions. The relationship between energy use and income is tenuous (Soytas et 
al. 2007). Variations in these studies involve the inclusion of variables that measure the 
extent of alternative sources of energy, trade and output growth. Iwata et al. (2010) 
include the consumption of nuclear energy in their study of the causal relationships 
between energy use, income and emissions in France. They find a unidirectional 
relationship between nuclear energy and carbon dioxide emissions, providing evidence 
that nuclear energy plays an important role in reducing carbon dioxide emissions.  
 
Directed Acyclical Graph 
An alternative method used to test for causality between variables is the Directed 
Acyclical Graph (DAG) approach (Pearl 1995). A DAG is a pictorial representation of 
the causal flow of information between variables. The letters V1,V2…Vn  are used to 
represent the variables included in the model. Lines with arrows represent the direction 
of causal flow of information between variables. These graphs represent conditional 
independence as implied by the recursive product decomposition characterized by 
equation III.17: 
(III.17)  pr(x1, x2 … … … … … . xn) = ∏ pr(xi
n
i=1 |ai), 
where pr is the probability of the variables or vertices of the graph, and pai is the 
realization of some subset of the variables that precedes the variable xi. According to 
Pearl (1986), the conditional independence relationships in equation III.17 can be 
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characterized graphically by using the property of D separation. Pearl (1995) defines D 
separation as follows: 
Let X, Y and Z be three disjoint subsets of vertices [variables] in a directed 
acyclic graph G, and let p be any path between vertex [variable] in X and a vertex 
[variable] in Y, where by ‘path’ we mean any succession of edges, regardless of their 
directions; Z is said to block p if there is a vertex w on p satisfying one of the following: 
(i) w has converging arrows along p, and w is in Z. Further, Z is said to d- separate X 
from Y on graph G, written (𝑋 Y|𝑍)𝐺, if and only if Z blocks every path from a vertex 
[variable] in X to a vertex [variable] in Y in Bessler et al. (2003, page 776). 
The connection between directed graphs and the random assignment model of 
Rubin (1978) and Holland (1986) is shown by Spirtes et al. (1999).  This implies that 
observational data can be represented by a DAG if they satisfy the following three 
criteria (Haigh and Bessler 2004): 
 Causal sufficiency condition: In the DAG there are no omitted variables that 
cause any two of the included variables in the study.  
 The Markovian condition: The causal flows included in the DAG respect a 
causal Markov condition. Consider variables, x, y and z. If x causes y and y 
causes z, the underlying probability distribution on x, y and z can be factored as 
pr(x,y,z) =pr(x)pr(y|x)pr(z|y). 
 The faithfulness condition:  Any two variables x and y included in the DAG are 
dependent if and only if there is an edge between x and y (Haigh and Bessler 
2004). 
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Various algorithms can be used to generate the graph. Two algorithms 
commonly used are: the Peter and Clarke (PC) algorithm and the Greedy Equivalence 
Search (GES) algorithm.  
The PC algorithm begins by forming a completely undirected graph; all the 
variables are connected by undirected edges. Edges are then removed stepwise between 
variables on the basis of tests of correlation. The PC algorithm employs the Neyman-
Pearson type of statistical tests of partial correlation. It assumes that the variables follow 
linear Gaussian distributions.  
The GES algorithm, on the other hand, is based on the goodness-of-fit scoring 
approach. This approach first defines the search space that contains all possible causal 
hypotheses represented by DAGs. It is based on the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). A goodness-of-fit measure is then used to choose the causal structure or DAG 
that best explains the data. One of the drawbacks of this approach is that the number of 
causal structures rapidly increases when the number of variables N increases.  
Both the PC and the GES algorithms are based on the assumption that the 
residuals are Gaussian. However, in practice very often the residuals are not normal. In 
these cases, algorithms such as the Linear Non Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM) and 
PC LiNGAM are used to generate the graphs. These algorithms are based on the idea 
that if residuals of a process are not Gaussian then higher order moments can be used to 
identify the equation (Moneta et al. 2013). 
One way of obtaining the residuals used to generate a DAG, is to use a VAR 
specification to model the data. As mentioned earlier, one of the drawbacks of the 
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Granger causality approach is its sensitivity to the original choice of explanatory 
variables. The DAG approach, on the other hand, does not induce the difficulty of 
deciding on the appropriate set of explanatory variables in the initial search step. 
Granger causality is associated with the VAR, whereas the DAG approach is associated 
with the structural vector auto regression (SVAR). Granger causality based on temporal 
ordering is not the scientific or philosophical foundation for a causal relationship (Kwon 
and Bessler 2011). The VAR does not provide sufficient information to study causal 
shocks of variables to economic systems; whereas, the SVAR allows for the recovery of 
causal relationships between variables. SVAR traces out how economically interpreted 
random shocks affect the system. If the Markov condition, the faithfulness condition 
and the causal sufficiency are satisfied, it is often enough to identify the SVAR. Very 
often these conditions are violated, but the SVAR can also be identified based on 
weaker conditions; if the residuals are non-Gaussian, alternate methods can be exploited 
to generate these graphs. 
 In many disciplines, the DAG technique has been applied to generate the causal 
flows between variables in observational data. Phenomena in agricultural economics are 
observed using the lens of experimental data or the lens of observational data. Causal 
frameworks are specified in experimental settings. However, there are many cases 
where experimental inquiry, and, therefore, random assignment, is not possible. 
Observational data, where the causal framework is not so well specified, are used to 
understand such phenomenon. DAGs can be used to understand the causal relationships 
between variables observed through the lens of observational data (Bessler 2013). For 
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example, DAGs are used to understand the relationship between prices and key 
macroeconomic variables (Kwon and Bessler 2011). 
 
Data 
In this chapter, evidence for causal relationships between pollution emissions 
and income is examined utilizing 4 commonly used datasets. Within the EKC context: 
sulfur, sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions are the most commonly used 
pollution indices. In this analysis, greater emphasis is placed on the relationship 
between sulfur (sulfur and sulfur dioxide) emissions and income, due to the regional 
nature of sulfur pollution, whereas, carbon dioxide is a global pollutant. The difference 
in the nature of the two pollutants could have an impact on the causal relationships 
between variables. 
The datasets for sulfur, sulfur dioxide emissions and carbon dioxide emissions 
have been previously used in Harbaugh et al. (2002)10,  Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh 
(2005)11, Vollebergh et al. (2009) and Stern and Common (2001)12.  
  The first dataset considered is Harbaugh et al.’s (2002) version of Grossman and 
Kreuger’s (1995) dataset. Harbaugh et al. (2002) clean up and reexamine the evidence 
for the EKC. Ten years of additional data are added to the original dataset so that the 
data now extend from 1971 to 1998. The new data are collected from the Aerometric 
                                                 
10 Data was obtained from the authors. 
11 Data was obtained from the authors. 
12Stern (2013) Accessed data on March 12th 2013 from http://www.sterndavidi.com/datasite.html. 
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Information Retrieval System (AIRS) and the World Health Organization. The original 
datasets are based on ambient pollution data, first collected by the Global 
Environmental Monitoring system (GEMS) (Harbaugh et al. 2002). Sulfur dioxide 
emissions are measured in micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3). The sources for the 
GDP data are the Penn World tables. Real per capita income is measured in 1000’s of 
1985 US dollars. The summary statistics for these data are presented in table III.2. Very 
preliminary analysis is carried out on these data. The data are unbalanced and there are 
very few observations within each panel. Annual data are collected for certain cities. 
 
Table III.2. Summary Statistics for Harbaugh’s Data 
 Sulfur dioxide GDP 
Mean 83.661 8.343 
Standard 
Deviation 
102.276 5.522 
Minimum 0.782 0.765 
Maximum 1159.854 18.095  
 
 
 
 
The second dataset, which we will refer to as the DV dataset, is the basis for 
EKC analyses in more recent literature. The data on carbon dioxide emissions is used in 
Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2005), and the combined dataset is used in Vollebergh et al. 
(2009). Annual carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions are reported from 1960 to 
2000. Only Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries are included. The original data sources are OECD (2000) and International 
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Energy Agency IEA/OECD (1991). The authors calculate carbon dioxide emissions 
using data on total energy supply. The DV data are corrected for non-energy use of fuels 
such as chemical feed stocks. Fuels incorporated in calculating the carbon emissions 
include coal, other solid fuels, crude oil petroleum products and natural gas (Dijkgraaf 
and Vollebergh 2005). Sulfur dioxide emissions are calculated on the basis of estimated 
sulfur content and sulfur retention or removal of waste streams (Vollebergh et al. 2009).  
Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in table III.3. Twenty-four 
countries are included in this analysis: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and United States of America. Summary statistics for these data are 
presented in table III.3.  Forty-one observations on carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide 
emissions and per capita GDP are available for each country. Figure III.113 is a 
representation of the relationship between per capita GDP and per capita carbon dioxide 
emissions for six selected countries; per capita carbon dioxide emissions are measured 
in millions of metric tons, whereas sulfur dioxide emissions are measured in metric 
tonnes. Per capita GDP is measured in 1990 US dollars. The source for the data on 
population and GDP is also the OECD (Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh 2005). 
 
 
                                                 
13 Luxembourg is not included in the analysis since it is an outlier. 
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Table III.3. Summary Statistics (Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh 2005) and (Vollebergh 
et al. 2009)  
  
GDP 
Carbon 
dioxide 
Sulfur 
dioxide 
Mean 13172.33 2605.501 28.672 
Standard Deviation 4992.064 1801.395 24.044 
Minimum 2770.521 166.541 1.253 
Maximum 33634.744 12333.352 154.291 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure III.1. The Relationship between Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Income for 
Selected Countries 
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Figure III.2 presents the relationship between sulfur dioxide emissions and GDP 
for five representative countries in the DV dataset. USA and Canada are outliers with 
much higher levels of SO2 per capita; therefore, they are not included in this 
representation as it would be difficult to appreciate the general trend in emissions 
among other countries.  
 
 
Figure III.2. Sulfur Dioxide Emissions and Income for Selected Countries 
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annual observations from 1850 to 1990. A complete list of the 74 countries included in 
the SC dataset is provided in appendix A.IV... Data for twelve selected countries (both 
OECD and non-OECD) are presented in figure III.3. Stern and Common (2001) use 
annual data from 1960 to 1990. The units of measurement for sulfur emissions are 
tonnes per capita. GDP is measured in per capita US$ of 1990 PPP. The sources for 
GDP data are the Penn World tables. Summary Statistics are presented in table III.4. 
 
Table III.4. Summary Statistics (Stern and Common 2001) 
  GDP Sulfur 
Mean 5359.908 0.022 
Standard Error 6244.168 0.037 
Minimum 303.000 8.85E-07 
Maximum 80830.800 0.466 
 
 
Methodology 
This section discusses the steps involved in revealing the causal relationships 
between pollution emissions and income. In the first step, pollution and income 
variables are tested for stationarity. In the second step, the panel VAR model is applied 
to the data and Granger causality tests are carried out. In the third step, the residuals of 
the VAR model are checked for normality. On the basis of these results, in the fourth 
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step, the appropriate causality tests and DAG algorithms are selected. In the fifth and 
final step, the results of these causality tests are discussed. 
 
 
 
Figure III.3. Sulfur Emissions and GDP for Selected Developing and Developed 
Countries 
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Breitung tests; therefore, it is concluded that all the variables considered in this analysis 
are non-stationary. The lag lengths for the stationarity tests are chosen on the basis of 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The values in tables III.5, III..5 are p values 
associated with the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
 
Table III.5. Stationarity Tests for DV’s Data. (H0: At Least One of the Panels 
Contain Unit Roots).14 
 
 LLC (p values) Breitung (p values) IPS (p values) 
Soiln 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Coiln 0.000 0.993 
 
0.000 
GDPiln 0.000 1.000 0.000 
GDPilnsq 0.000 1.000 0.032 
 
 
Table III.6.: Stationarity Tests for Stern and Common’s (2001) Data. (H0: At 
Least One of the Panels Contain Unit Roots). 
 LLC (p values) Breitung (p values) IPS (p values) 
Soiln 0.005 0.547 0.891 
GDPiln 0.000 1.000 0.898 
GDPilnsq 0.000 1.000 0.992 
 
 
                                                 
14 The entire sample is considered while conducting the stationarity tests. Though, Luxembourg is 
dropped, while considering the DV dataset. The outcomes of the stationarity tests still remain the same 
when Luxembourg is not included 
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In addition to being non-stationary, the data might also contain fixed effects; 
therefore, the Helmert transformation is applied to the data to remove the fixed effects. 
The Helmart transformation is a forward mean differencing procedure. After this 
transformation, the data are first differenced to remove trend effects. The three 
stationarity tests are once again carried out on the transformed data. The null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity is rejected for all three variables, by all three tests. This result holds 
true for both DV’s and SC’s datasets. These results are presented in tables III.7 and 
III.8. 
  
Table III.7. Stationarity Tests for DV’s (2001) Data (First differenced and Helmart 
Transformed). (H0: At Least One of the Panels Contain Unit Roots). 
 LLC ( p values) Breitung (p values) IPS (p values) 
dCoiln 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 dSoiln 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dGDPiln 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dGDPilnsq 0.000 0.007 0.000 
 
 
Table III.8. Stationarity Tests for Stern and Common’s (2001) data (First 
Differenced and Helmart Transformed). (H0: At Least one of the Panels Contain 
Unit Roots). 
 LLC (p values) Breitung (p values) IPS ( p values) 
dSoiln 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dGDPiln 0.000 0.000 0.000 
dGDPilnsq 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Panel VAR  
The VAR structure treats all variables considered in the model as endogenous 
and interdependent and is, therefore, the appropriate method to employ when examining 
the causal structure between variables. The panel VAR structure is similar to the VAR 
structure discussed earlier; however, another dimension is added. Equation III.18 is a 
representation of a panel VAR model. The panel VAR technique combines the 
traditional VAR approach and the panel data approach. All the variables considered are 
endogenous like the traditional VAR approach; however, it also allows for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity like the panel data approach (Klien 2010). 
(III.18)  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑝
𝑛
𝑠=1 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,     
where, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the vector of endogenous variables for region i in the time t, which in this 
analysis would be either per capita carbon dioxide or per capita sulfur emissions or per 
capita GDP for country i in year t. The term 𝑓𝑖 captures country-specific fixed effects. 
This methodology is used to generate the relationship between pollution 
emissions and income for DV’s and SC’s datasets. It is not used for Harbaugh et al.’s 
(2002) dataset due to the unbalanced nature of the data. The results are generated for 
sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions and are presented in table III.9. The results 
for DV’s data are generated without Luxembourg data on carbon dioxide emissions. 
Similarly, the panel VARs for DV’s data on sulfur dioxide emissions are also generated 
without US and Iceland data. These data are outliers and could significantly affect the 
specification of the model. 
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The choice of the appropriate lag length is based on the Schwarz Bayesian 
criteria (SBC)15. The optimal lag lengths for DV’s datasets on carbon dioxide and sulfur 
dioxide are three and one, respectively; however, the optimal lag length for SC’s dataset 
is 4. The results of the panel VAR model are presented in table III.9. Before estimating 
the panel VAR, as mentioned earlier, the Helmert transformation is applied to control 
for endogenity created by the correlation between the lags and the explanatory variable. 
After this, data are first differenced to remove trend effects. The first-differencing 
procedure introduces a simultaneity problem because lagged endogenous variables are 
correlated with the new differenced error term; to account for this problem, the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method is used to estimate the model. 
Impulse response functions are also generated and are presented in appendix A.V.. The 
impulse response functions describe the reaction of one variable to innovations in 
another variable; all other variables are held constant (Love and Ziccinio 2006). The 
panel VAR specifications presented in table III.9 are used to generate residuals: 
dlnGDP- first differenced natural log of per capita GDP 
dlnCO2- first differenced natural log of per capita carbon dioxide emissions 
dlnSO-first differenced natural log of per capita sulfur dioxide or sulfur emissions 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
15 At five lags the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix for the residuals for Stern’s dataset first 
increases slightly before decreasing. 
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Table III.9. Panel VAR Results 
 
CO2 SO2 
 DV’s 
data 
  DV’s 
data 
 SC’s 
data 
 
 dlnGDP dlnCO2  dlnGDP dlnSO2 dlnGDP dln
SO2 
Lag1 
dlnGDP 
.378*** 
(.047) 
.468*** 
(.092) 
Lag1 
dlnGDP 
.478*** 
(.035) 
.611*** 
(.222) 
.180*** 
(.041) 
.308* 
(.180) 
Lag 1 
dlnCO2 
.067*** 
(.018) 
-.077* 
(.044) 
Lag 1 
dlnSO2 
-.012* 
(.007) 
-.016 
(.095) 
.002 
(.009) 
.099 
(.084) 
Lag 2 
dlnGDP 
-.017 
(.050) 
.020* 
(.099) 
Lag 2 
dlnSO2 
 
 
 
 
-.004 
(.034) 
.169 
(.135) 
Lag 2 
dlnCO2 
-.008 
(.018) 
.018* 
(.043) 
Lag 2 
dlnSO2 
 
 
 
 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.091 
(.079) 
Lag 3 
dlnGDP 
.161*** 
(.043) 
.127* 
(.086) 
Lag 3 
dlnGDP 
. 
 
 
 
.108*** 
(.030) 
.096 
(.113) 
Lag 3 
dlnCO2 
.024 
(.017) 
.094** 
(.038) 
Lag 3 
dlnSO 
 
 
 -.011* 
(.007) 
-.060 
(.042) 
   Lag4   .014 -.036 
   dLnGDP   (.028) (.122) 
   Lag 4   .008* -.019 
   dlnSO   (.004) (.027) 
 
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
The residuals from the panel VAR are tested for normality using the Skewness 
and Kurtosis (SK) test. The variables, themselves, are also tested for normality. The 
results of these tests are presented in appendix A.V... The results of the SK test suggest 
that the residuals and the variables are not normally distributed. Therefore, causality can 
be established on the basis of higher order moments (Moneta et al. 2013). The DAG 
diagrams illustrate the causal relationship between per capita GDP and per capita 
pollution emission variables.  
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Directed Acyclical Graphs (DAG) 
DAGs are used to convert VARs into Structural VARs (SVARs). While VARs 
cannot be used to determine causal relationships between variables, SVARs furnish 
VAR models with structural information, so that one can recover the causal 
relationships under investigation. The SVAR places additional restrictions on the error 
matrix compared to the VAR Baum (2013).  Theory or information provided by DAGs 
is used in the SVAR procedure to make assumptions about contemporaneous 
correlations of the error terms. 
When the residuals are not normally distributed, as mentioned earlier, the 
LiNGAM algorithm is used to generate the DAGs. This algorithm exploits the non-
linearity of the residuals; this aids the identification of causal relationships between 
variables. Though Gaussian data are analytically easier to handle than non-Gaussian 
data, non-Gaussian data impose a lot more structure, making it easier to identify causal 
relationships between variables. LiNGAM assumes that the variables are linear and non-
Gaussian. The steps involved in this process are as follows: Independent Component 
Analysis (ICA) is employed to estimate the coefficient matrix. ICA is a technique that is 
closely related to Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA transforms the original 
space such that the computed latent components are (linearly) uncorrelated. The ICA 
goes one step further and attempts to minimize all the statistical dependencies between 
the resulting components (Moneta et al. 2013). The coefficient matrix is then rearranged 
to obtain a causal order. In the final step, the algorithm prunes the weak coefficients by 
setting them equal to zero (Ramsay 2013). 
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The residuals from the PVARs were used to generate DAGs. These figures 
clearly indicate that the direction of causality between variables is unidirectional; per 
capita GDP influences per capita emissions in all cases, and these are represented by the 
directed acyclical graphs generated below. In this context, it means that changing values 
of income in contemporary time will lead to changes in the value of pollution in 
contemporary time. This entire process is known as the VARLiNGAM procedure. 
These diagrams are generated using the computer program TETRAD. The diagrams 
below show that the data indicate that changing values of GDP in current time will lead 
to changes in values of pollution in current time. They are a representation of the 
manipulative approach to causality within the EKC context. This causal relationship is 
used to inform the DAGs generated to describe the EKC relationship.  
 
DV dataset  DV dataset  SC dataset 
 
(1.0)                              (1.0)                                 (1.0) 
 
Notes: CO2 RES = carbon dioxide residuals from the panel VAR specification; SO2 RES = sulfur dioxide 
residuals from the panel VAR specification; GDPRES = per capita GDP residuals from the panel VAR 
specification. 
 
Figure III.4. DAGs Generated Using the LINGAM Algorithm (PVAR Residuals) 
 
CO2RES
GDPRES
SO2RES
GDPRES
SO2RES
GDPRES
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The DAGs in figure III.4 can be used to capture an EKC type of relationship. 
The option of including prior knowledge is employed here; based on the above causality 
results, the variable, pollution emissions, is chosen as an exogenous variable, whereas, 
GDP and GDP squared are chosen to be endogenous variables. No such knowledge and 
restrictions could be used for Harbaugh et al.’s (2002) data.  The DAGs that use this 
prior information are presented in figure III.5 (except Harbaugh’s dataset).  There is 
evidence of an EKC relationship for the DV’s carbon dioxide dataset at the 5% level of 
significance. The direction of causation is not apparent as prior information cannot be 
used for Harbaugh’s dataset. These results are generated using the PC16 algorithm, 
discussed earlier. The EKC relationship is observed for DV’s and SC’s datasets at a 
much higher level of significance. In order to generate an acyclic graph, a restriction is 
placed such that per capita GDP and per capita GDP squared cannot influence each 
other. The DAGs provide a representation of causality in contemporaneous time and are 
based on the manipulative definition of causality versus a predictive definition of 
causality. 
The relationships estimated reveal that there is evidence supporting a U-shaped 
relationship between the variables considered. The direction of the relationship between 
variables is based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results. The relationship 
between per capita income and emissions is positive, and the relationship between per 
                                                 
16 The PC algorithm assumes that variables follow a Gaussian distribution. This assumption is violated. 
The LiNGAM algorithm is also used to generate these results, however TETRAD does not allow for use 
of previous knowledge for the LiNGAM algorithm.  
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capita income and income squared is negative. The direction of causality cannot be 
determined between per capita GDP and per capita GDP2; therefore, to generate a DAG, 
a restriction must be placed on these variables.  When unrestricted, an edge is present; 
this presence suggests that there is a relationship between these variables; however, the 
direction of causality cannot be directed by the information given.  The causal 
relationship between per capita GDP and per capita GDP2 can be restricted using 
previous knowledge.  
 
DV’s data   DV’s data   SC’s data 
 
      
( -)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (+) 
 
(0.05)    (0.3)     (0.15) 
Harbaugh et al.’s data 
 
 
 
(0.8) 
Notes: lnSO2 = natural log of per capita sulfur dioxide emissions; lnCO2 = natural log of per capita 
carbon dioxide emissions; lnGDP = natural log of per capita GDP; lnGDP2 = Square of the natural log of 
per capita GDP.  
 
Figure III.5. DAGs Generated Using the PC Algorithm (Non-Stationary Data)   
lnCO2 
lnGDP2 
lnGDP 
lnSO2 
lnGDP2 lnGDP 
lnSO2 
lnGDP2 lnGDP 
lnSO2 
lnGDP2 lnGDP 
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In that case, all that remains is the EKC relationship between per capita pollution 
emissions, per capita GDP and per capita GDP2. Alternate specifications of the DAGs 
generated within the EKC context are presented below, in figures III.6. and III.7. These 
DAGs are generated for stationary data. 
The levels of significance at which the EKC relationship is said to exist are 
presented in the parentheses below the DAG’s. For the PC algorithms, these are p 
values, and for the LiNGAM algorithms these are the prune factors. For the DV’s 
carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide dataset both the PC and LiNGAM algorithms support 
an EKC relationship at the 0.05 level of significance and 0.7 and 0.98 prune values. 
This  
 
 
 
DV’s data    DV’s data   SC’s data 
 
      
( +)  (-)  (+)   (-) (+)   (-) 
  
(0.05)     (0.05)    (0.1) 
Notes:  dlnSO2 = the first difference of the natural log of per capita sulfur dioxide emissions; dlnCO2 = 
the first difference of the natural log of per capita carbon dioxide emissions; dlnGDP = the first difference 
of the natural log of per capita GDP;  dlnGDP2 = the first difference of the square of natural log of per 
capita GDP. 
 
Figure III.6. DAGs Generated Using the PC Algorithm (First Differenced 
Stationary Data) 
dlnCO2 
dlnGDP
2 
dlnGDP2 
 
dlnSO2 
dlnGDP dlnGDP2 
 
dlnSO2 
dlnGDP2 
 
dlnGDP2 
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suggests that higher levels of income push down carbon dioxide emissions and sulfur 
dioxide emissions. This relationship is also observed for the DV Sulfur and SC dataset 
at either a higher level of significance or lower prune value. 
The DAGs for stationary data, using the PC algorithm, provide stronger 
evidence for an EKC relationship than the DAGs for non-stationary data, comparing 
figures III.5 and III.6. However, the levels of significance at which such a relationship is 
found varies for each dataset, especially when the LiNGAM algorithm is used. Previous 
knowledge cannot be used to place restrictions on the data within the LiNGAM setup.  
 
DV’s data   DV’s data   SC’s data 
 
      
( -)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)         (+) 
 
  
(0.7)    (0.98)     (0.2) 
 
Notes:  dlnSO2 = the first difference of the natural log of per capita sulfur dioxide emissions; dlnCO2 = 
the first difference of the natural log of per capita carbon dioxide emissions; dlnGDP = the first difference 
of the natural log of per capita GDP;  dlnGDP2 = the first difference of the square of natural log of per 
capita GDP. 
 
Figure III.7. DAGs Generated Using the LiNGAM Algorithm (First Differenced 
Stationary Data)  
 
 
dlnSO
2 
dlnSO
2 
dlnGDP2 
 
dlnGDP2 
 
dlnGDP
2 
dlnGDP dlnGDP2 
 
dlnGDP
2 
dlnCO
2 
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The result from the LiNGAM algorithm varies from the PC algorithm; the direction of 
causality between per capita GDP and per capita GDP2 is clear. The LiNGAM 
algorithm exploits the non-Gaussian nature of the data to identify causal relationships 
(Moneta et al. 2013). 
 
Granger causality  
 While, the DAG approach is rooted in contemporaneous values of variables, the 
Granger causality approach to causality is based on the influence of lagged variables. 
Two alternate methods for estimating Granger causality are employed. The first is 
Hurlin’s (2004) approach, which has been employed frequently in recent literature. 
The first step is the testing of the homogeneous non-causality hypothesis; the 
assumption under the null hypothesis is that there is no causal relationship between 
pollution emissions and GDP for all countries. The alternative hypothesis is that there is 
a causal relationship between pollution and emissions for at least one country in the 
sample. The values of the coefficients of the model are allowed to vary across the 
different panels. The statistic used to test for causality is an average of individual Wald 
statistics that are used to test for Granger causality for each country. The following 
model is fit to the data. The two variables considered, x and y (in this analysis, per 
capita emissions and pollution emissions), are assumed to be covariance stationary. For 
each country i=1………N, at time t=1,……,N, the following model is considered 
(Hurlin and Venet 2008): 
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(III.19)  𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
(𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +∑ 𝛽𝑖
(𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
 The lag lengths are assumed to be identical across all cross-sectional units. The 
homogenous non-causality hypothesis is represented by the following equation, III.20:  
(III.20)  H0: βi = 0∀𝑖 = 1, … . 𝑁.       
Under the alternative hypothesis, βi is allowed to vary across groups; it is 
assumed that there is a causal relationship between panels of variables in the data. The 
test statistic, the Wald statistic, is an average of individual Wald statistics for each 
country. An individual Wald statistic is associated with a null hypothesis: 
(III.21)  H0: βi = 0.        
 Each of these statistics, under the null hypothesis of non-causality, converge to a 
chi-square distribution. Therefore, when N and T tend to infinity, this average Wald 
statistic follows the standard normal distribution (Hurlin and Venet 2008): 
(III.22)   ZN,T
Hnc = √
N
2K
(WN,T
Hnc − K) → N(0,1).      
If the time dimension, T, is fixed, the individual chi-square distributions need not 
converge to a universal chi-square statistic. Hurlin (2004) then proposes an approximate 
standardized statistic ?̃?𝑁,𝑇
𝐻𝑛𝑐 (Hurlin and Venet 2008): 
(III.23)  ?̃?𝑵,𝑻
𝑯𝒏𝒄=
√𝑵[𝑾𝑵,𝑻
𝑯𝒏𝒄−𝑵−𝟏 ∑ 𝑬(𝑾𝒊,𝑻)
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏 ]
√𝑵−𝟏 ∑ 𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝑾𝒊,𝑻)
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
.     
 The entire Granger causality test is carried out by using the program written by 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). The results of the Granger causality tests are presented 
below in Tables III.10, III.11 and III.12. The selection of the lag length is not clear; 
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therefore, following Dumitrescu and Hurlin’s (2012) work, results are presented for the 
first three lags. The sizes of their dataset and the datasets considered in this study are 
similar. 
 
Table III.10. DV Dataset Carbon Dioxide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 p here refers to the lag length; the choice of lag length is based on Hurlin and Venet (2008). 
18 The values in parentheses are the p values. 
 p17=1 p=2 p=3 
H0: Carbon dioxide emissions does not Granger cause per capita GDP 
Wald 
Statistic 
2.231 3.010 3.686 
Z bar 
statistic 
4.173(0.000)18 4.844(0.000) 4.029(0.000) 
Z tilda 
statistic 
3.588(0.000) 1.876(0.061) 0.822(0.411) 
H0: GDP per capita does not Granger cause carbon dioxide emissions 
Wald 
Statistic 
2.699 3.675 5.712 
Z bar 
statistic 
5.761(0.000) 8.034(0.000) 15.926(0.000) 
Z tilda 
statistic 
5.022(0.000) 3.286(0.001) 4.247(0.001) 
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Table III.11. DV Dataset Sulfur Dioxide 
 p=1 p=2 p=3 
H0: Sulfur dioxide emissions do not Granger cause GDP per capita 
Wald Statistic 0.985 2.193 3.601 
Z bar statistic -0.0531(0.958) 0.946(0.344) 3.606(0.000) 
Z tilda statistic -0.336(0.736) 0.147(0.882) 0.693(0.489) 
H0: GDP per capita does not Granger cause sulfur dioxide emissions 
Wald Statistic 3.049 4.054 5.491 
Z bar statistic 7.10(0.000) 10.064(0.000) 14.947(0.000) 
Z tilda statistic 6.225(0.000) 4..178(0.000) 4.957(0.000) 
 
 
Table III.12.  SC Sulfur Dataset 
 p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 
H0: Sulfur dioxide emissions  do not Granger cause GDP 
Wald 
Statistic 
1.163 2.431 3.778 4.920 
Z bar 
statistic 
0.992(0.321) 3.720(0.000) 8.201(0.000) 11.191(0.000) 
Z tilda 
statistic 
0.4196(0.675) 0.900(0.369) 1.351(0.177) 1.110(0.261) 
H0: GDP per capita  does not Granger cause sulfur dioxide emissions 
Wald 
Statistic 
1.140 2.881 4.509 5.941 
Z bar 
statistic 
2.445(0.014) 7.575(0.000) 15.894(0.000) 23.613 (0.000) 
Z tilda 
statistic 
1.681(0.093) 2.515(0.012) 3.413(0.001) 3.493(0.001) 
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The direction of causality based on the results in table III.10 for DV’s dataset is 
ambiguous at the 5% level of significance and one lag specification; there is a 
bidirectional relationship between emissions and income (the hypothesis of non-
causality is rejected in both directions). However, for two and three lags, the 
relationship is unidirectional; per capita GDP Granger causes emissions (the hypothesis 
can only be rejected in one direction). Tables III.11 and III.12, based on the z statistic, 
support a bidirectional causality relationship between emissions and per capita GDP for 
lags greater than two (the hypothesis of non-causality is rejected in both directions). The 
z tilda statistic supports a unidirectional causality relationship; income Granger causes 
emissions (the hypothesis of non-causality can only be rejected in one direction). An 
alternate estimation of the panel Granger causality test is presented appendix A.V... This 
test is based on the PVAR model estimated by equation III.18. The results from this 
model generally indicate that the direction of causation between variables is 
bidirectional. 
 
Results 
The DAG and the Granger causality approaches have been used to examine the 
direction of causality between variables. The data have been transformed by the Helmert 
procedure and taking first differences. These procedures control for fixed effects and 
make the data stationary, reducing the risk of spurious correlations. 
The results of the DAG analysis, a part of the VARLiNGAM procedure, indicate 
that there is a clear unidirectional causal relationship from GDP to pollution emissions. 
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This result is true across all three datasets and the two pollutants sulfur dioxide and 
carbon dioxide. The DAGs were also generated with different lag lengths: the 
unidirectional relationship between income and emissions appears to be robust to 
different lag specifications. This result provides information about the possible SVAR 
model, allowing for possible policy recommendations in contemporary time. Carson 
(2010) states by using a reduced-form regression equation we cannot conclude that 
changing values of per capita GDP lead to changes in pollution emissions. However, the 
VARLiNGAM approach used here provides evidence that values of pollution emissions 
are changed by changing values of per capita GDP, in contemporary time. 
Hurlin’s (2004) approach to causality, like the DAG approach, finds a strong 
unidirectional causal relationship from GDP to sulfur dioxide emissions. However, the 
results for carbon dioxide emissions are more ambiguous, at one lag specification; at the 
5 % percent level of significance there is a bidirectional causal relationship between 
emissions and income. At two and three lag specifications, the relationship is a 
unidirectional causal relationship from GDP to carbon dioxide emissions.  
 On the basis of these tests, it is difficult to decide if the relationship between 
pollution emissions and GDP per capita in DV’s carbon dioxide dataset is unidirectional 
or bidirectional. The relationship between sulfur dioxide emissions and per capita GDP 
is unidirectional, and the direction of causation is from emissions to GDP. Most 
Granger causality studies within the EKC context focus on a single country; therefore, it 
might not be appropriate to compare the results of those studies with the results from 
this study. However, the study by Coondoo and Dinda (2002), which examines Granger 
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causality results between emissions and GDP per capita across various groups of 
countries, finds that for the developed countries in USA and Europe), the causality 
relation is from emissions to income. The DV dataset, which is comprised of OECD 
countries, does not support this result. There does not appear to be a panel analysis of 
the causal relationships between sulfur dioxide emissions and per capita GDP.  
Finally, the DAGs generated using the untransformed data reveal a positive 
causal relationship between GDP and emissions and a negative relationship between 
GDP squared and emissions; supporting the EKC hypothesis only at high levels of 
significance. The level of significance was taken to be 0.2 for DV’s carbon dioxide data 
set. The significance level had to be increased to 0.4 to observe a relationship between 
GDP, GDP squared and sulfur dioxide emissions for Sulfur data sets’s data. The results 
at these significance levels support a U-shaped relationship. The OLS regression is used 
to determine the sign of the relationship between the variables. These results are 
identical to the OLS results obtained by Stern (2010). The DAGs are also generated 
with stationary data. The LiNGAM algorithm was also used to generate the casual 
relationship. The alternate specifications also support a U-shaped relationship between 
emissions and income. However, the levels of significance at which this relationship is 
found to be significant for the LiNGAM procedure is low. The greater ability of the 
LiNGAM method to identify causal relationships between variables, when compared to 
the PC algorithm, is revealed in the comparison of figures III.6 and III.7.  
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Limitations 
Among the limitations of this analysis, two are particularly worth highlighting. 
First, the Granger causality test is based on the assumption that the residuals are 
distributed normally; the test statistic might, therefore, not follow the Chi-Square 
distribution. The PC algorithm used to generate the graphs also assumes that the 
variables are distributed normally. However, the SK test rejects the assumption that the 
residuals are normally distributed.  
 Secondly, this study is based on previously used datasets; the DV and SC 
datasets do not consider any additional variables other than per capita emissions and 
GDP. Additional factors may well influence pollution; these factors are not controlled, 
since this study is based on previously used datasets. Harbaugh et al.’s (2002) dataset 
does contain information on additional variables; however, due to the unbalanced nature 
of the data, extensive analysis is not carried out on this data. However, the DAG 
approach assumes that all variables are included in the model (causal sufficiency). 
 
Conclusion 
The two approaches to causality explored in this chapter are based on different 
definitions. The Granger causality approach is based on the predictive definition of 
causality, whereas the DAG approach is based on the manipulative definition of 
causation. The Granger causality approach is an indicator of the ability of one variable 
to predict another. Whereas the DAG approach is rooted in contemporaneous time and 
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is an indicator of whether changing contemporaneous values of one variable has an 
impact on the values of the other variable. 
The main contribution of this essay is the application of the VARLiNGAM 
approach to causality analysis within the EKC. By using DAGs, we can convert the 
VARs into SVARs by using directed acyclical graphs. Therefore, utilizing the DAG 
approach, policy recommendations can be made based on the results. In this context, 
there is evidence to suggest that current values of pollution emissions are changed by 
changing current values of GDP per capita.  
Moreover, using the results from the VARLiNGAM procedure, the DAG using 
the PC algorithm can also be used to test causal relationships associated with the EKC 
hypothesis. The causal relationship between pollution emissions and GDP is positive, 
whereas the relationship between GDP squared and income is negative. This supports a 
U- shaped relationship between pollution emissions and income. The LiNGAM model 
also supports these results. This study also highlights the greater ability of the LiNGAM 
process to identify causal relationships when compared to the PC algorithm. 
More generally, DAGs provide a useful tool to test and represent causal 
relationships between environmental and economic indices, thereby providing a tool to 
empirically test theoretical frameworks within environmental economics. 
Granger causality, on the other hand, as mentioned earlier, is based on the ability 
of the past values of one variable to predict another variable; therefore, the fact that 
there is a certain amount of correlation between the variables, could also lead to the 
conclusion that one variable Granger causes the other. Such analysis gives us insights 
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into why certain bidirectional causal relationships between income and pollution 
emissions could not be rejected in the case of carbon dioxide. One of the contributions 
of this essay is to use Hurlin’s (2004) approach to test for panel Granger causality. 
Both the Granger causality approach and the DAG approach incorporate Hume’s 
definition of causality. Therefore, both methods need to be used to understand the 
causal relationships between variables. The DAG approach can be used to provide 
evidence of an EKC relationship. 
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CHAPTER IV  
EXAMINING THE ROLES OF THE SOCIAL FORESTRY PROGRAM AND THE 
JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN THE INDIAN FOREST 
TRANSITION 
 
Over the past twenty years, the forest area in India has stabilized. Many 
countries have experienced the phenomenon of traversing from net deforestation to net 
afforestation, leading to the formulation of the Forest Transition (FT) theory. 
Specifically, the FT theory predicts various changes in forest cover over time: (1) 
initially high forest cover and low deforestation, (2) accelerating and high deforestation, 
(3) slow-down of deforestation and forest cover stabilization, and (4) a period of 
reforestation (Angelsen 2007). 
According to Mather (2007), India has experienced the first two stages of the FT 
and is said to be in the third or the fourth stage of the FT theory. The majority of forest 
area in India is under state control; private participation in forest management has 
generally been discouraged. Moreover, the focus of forest management was initially on 
producing commercial timber rather than producing fuelwood, fodder and small timber 
for the local population. The Joint Forest Management (JFM) and the Social Forestry 
Programs have been initiated to focus on these needs. 
The aim of this analysis is to provide possible explanations for Indian FT and to 
examine the roles of these programs in the Indian FT. These two programs signaled a 
change in property rights of forest resources; the policies on which the programs are 
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based focus on needs of the local population and the decentralization of forest resources. 
These policy measures, which signaled the move towards decentralization and greater 
community rights, coincided with the FT. 
 This analysis is divided into the following sections. The first section is a 
description of recent forestry trends in countries that have experienced an FT in Asia, 
and provides the motivation for the proposed analysis. The second section focuses on 
FT theory. The third section is an overview of the forest policy in India, and how it has 
changed over time; focusing particularly on the Social Forestry Program and the JFM 
Program. The fifth section is an exploration of the role of these programs in the FT of 
India. The sixth section is the conclusion. 
 
Recent Trends in Forestry  
India experienced deforestation beginning in the 1800’s. However, the forest 
area has stabilized in the recent past. The forest transition experience in both China and 
Vietnam has been more pronounced than the Indian forest transition; table IV.1. 
describes the long-term trends in forestry in these three countries. 
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Table IV.1. Long-Term Trends in Forest Cover (Millions of Hectares) 
China India Vietnam 
Year Forest Cover Year Forest 
Cover 
Year Forest Cover 
  1880 102.7 1880 25.0 
  1920 94.8 1920 20.7 
1949 102.3 1950 82.5 1950 18.9 
1977–81 95.6 1970 74.3 1970 16.4 
1989–93 108.6 1980 64.6 1980 14.8 
Source: (Mather 2007) Table 2 pg. 493 adapted from ( India,Vietnam-Flint and Richards 1994) and 
(China-Fang et al. 2001). Recent Asian forest transitions in relation to forest-transition theory 
published in the International Forestry Review 9:491-502, reproduced with permission from 
Commonwealth Forestry Association. 
 
 
While the sources and definitions of forest have changed over time, it is apparent 
that all these countries have experienced deforestation. However, beginning in the 
1990’s the forest area in all three countries has increased. Figure IV.1 shows the 
increase in forest area in India over the past twenty years. There is some controversy on 
whether this change is a result of increasing natural growth forest or whether it is due to 
the increase in plantation forest. Puyravaud et al. (2010) found empirical evidence that 
suggests that although total forest area based on forest cover might be increasing, the 
area of natural forests is actually decreasing; most of the increase in forest area is due to 
the growth of tree plantations.  
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Figure IV.1. Percentage of Total Forest Area in 1000 HA19 
Source: FAOSTAT 2014a 
 
There has been an increase in demand for forestry products with an increase in 
population. Table IV.2. below represents the trends in forestry products20. The forest 
products are chosen based on products considered in Guha (1983). The demand for 
forest products such as pulpwood and fuelwood has increased over time. The products 
considered are fuelwood (charcoal and non-charcoal), paper and paper board, wood 
pulp, round wood and industrial round wood. These figures are five-year averages. 
Table IV.2. below reveals that there has been an increase in the production across all 
forest products. There is a particularly sharp increase in the production of wood pulp 
and paper and paperboard which uses wood pulp for its manufacture. 
                                                 
19  FAOSTAT 2014a Accessed data in January 2014. Website last accessed on 23rd May 2014. 
(http://faostat.fao.org/site/377/default.aspx#ancor). 
20 FAOSTAT 2014a Accessed data in February 2014, Website last accessed website on 23rd May 2014 
(http://faostat.fao.org/site/626/default.aspx). 
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Table IV.2. Forest Products 
  
Wood 
Fuel 
(C) 
Wood 
Fuel 
(NC) 
Wood 
Fuel  
Industrial 
Round 
Wood  
Round 
Wood  
Paper and 
Paper 
Board  
Wood 
 Pulp 
    100,000’s m3     1000's tonnes 
1961–
1965 48.580 1566.822 1615.402 75.262 1690.664 541.020 30.600 
1966–
1970 54.034 1742.727 1796.761 116.278 1913.039 751.860 78.000 
1971–
1975 60.970 1966.437 2027.407 147.684 2175.091 861.800 266.620 
1976–
1980 66.939 2158.961 2225.900 183.168 2409.068 985.600 451.080 
1981–
1985 73.911 2383.803 2457.714 221.598 2679.312 1430.200 682.000 
1986–
1990 80.836 2607.163 2687.999 242.186 2930.185 1977.800 946.400 
1991–
1995 85.934 2771.602 2857.536 246.906 3104.442 2680.000 1104.200 
1996–
2000 83.420 2690.380 2773.800 190.742 2964.542 3381.205 1437.000 
2001–
2005 89.586 2889.349 2978.935 205.908 3184.843 4419.001 1855.080 
2006–
2010 92.559 2985.250 3077.809 231.922 3309.731 8188.144 2307.600 
Source: FAOSTAT 2014b 
 
The Forest Transition 
Mather and Needle (1998) formulate the FT model by documenting forestry 
trends across various countries in the world. This documentation of forestry rates 
provides evidence for the FT model. Mather (2007) discusses the forestry experience in 
Asia focusing on China, Vietnam and India; all three countries have experienced a 
forest transition. According to his paper, the FT in India occurred in the 1990s. He 
considers a number of possible explanations for the forest transition and concludes that 
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radical policy measures are the possible explanation for FT in Asia. In the paragraphs 
that follow, we summarize the various theories that been proposed to explain the FT 
process. 
 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis 
The EKC hypothesis predicts a U-shaped relationship between income and 
environmental harm. Applied to deforestation this could mean that as income increases, 
deforestation first increases and then decreases. Mather et al. (1999) observe that while 
there is longitudinal evidence for an EKC for deforestation, the U-shaped curve seems 
to be linked to time rather than income. It is difficult to build a causal story between 
income and deforestation.  
Cropper and Griffiths (1994) provide a theoretical explanation for the EKC 
relationship in forestry. First, rising income leads to an increase in demand for logging 
and fuelwood. However, with continued increases in income there is a decline in 
demand for fuelwood and agriculture, resulting in the downward sloping relationship at 
higher income levels. At the micro–scale, Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1989) find 
evidence that suggests that increases in income lead to a decrease in demand for 
fuelwood. In the case of India, due to rapid increases in population, the overall demand 
for fuelwood has increased. 
There have been many investigations interested in examining empirical evidence 
for such an EKC relationship in the forest sector. Conclusions from empirical 
investigations into this area vary: Bhattarai and Hammig (2001, 2004) and Cropper and 
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Griffiths (1994) find evidence for an EKC in deforestation, while Koop and Tole (1999) 
found no evidence for this kind of relationship (Mather 2007).  
These empirical EKC studies also estimate the turning point in the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Within the Asian context, Bhattarai and Hammig 
(2001) state that the FT has taken place in countries where the GDP per capita exceeds 
US $7750 (1985 data). However, as Mather (2007) points out, there are countries in 
Asia where the FT has occurred in the $2000–$4000 range. India’s per capita GDP 
measured in current dollars is still lower than US $7750. Moreover, other countries in 
Asia, for example, Malaysia and the Philippines, are economically more prosperous 
than India but have yet to experience an FT (Mather 2007).  
 
Borlaug hypothesis 
Another explanation offered to explain the FT phenomenon is known as the 
Borlaug hypothesis. It has been argued by Norman Borlaug and others that the 
intensification of agriculture leads to greater land being available for alternate uses, one 
of them being forestry (World Resources Institute 1986; Rudel and Horowitz 1993; 
Southgate 1998; Rudel 2001). In an attempt to capture this effect, a cereal index or a 
time trend is included in empirical studies that examine the factors that influence 
deforestation. The results from these studies are inconclusive (Culas 2007). Theory also 
suggests that the impact of technological change on the extent of agricultural land 
depends on the type of technical change (Angelsen 2001). Foster and Rosenzweig 
(2003), in their study of a forest growth, using a cross-section of 235 villages across 
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India, do not find empirical evidence to support the Borlaug hypothesis. Specifically, 
they find no empirical evidence to suggest that increases in agricultural productivity due 
to the Green Revolution led to less cultivated acreage or more forest growth (Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2003). 
However, Mather (2007) found that the agricultural area in India had stabilized, 
and the increases in rice and wheat yields were higher for the FT countries than for the 
non-FT countries; however, this effect was confined to rice and wheat yields. FAO data 
indicate that the price of rice, wheat and sorghum in India decreased during the 1990’s. 
 
The ecosystem service hypothesis 
The basis for the “Ecosystem Service Hypothesis” is degradation of forest area. 
Forest land degrades to an extent where the local population can no longer depend on it 
to provide certain commodities and services. This leads to the abandonment of forest 
area and the regeneration of the forest area (Satake and Rudel 2007). Mather (2007) 
observes that the Asian forest transition occurred in countries at rates at relatively high 
percentages of forest cover when compared to the FT experience in the European and 
North American countries.  
 
The forest scarcity hypothesis 
A fourth theoretical explanation has its foundations in a microeconomic model 
and is known as the “Forest Scarcity Hypothesis’’ (Hyde 1980). This hypothesis has 
been recast by Rudel (1998) and Rudel et al. (2005). It states that as forest cover 
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declines, forest products become scarcer and the prices of these products increase. This 
provides incentives for people to afforest and protect existing forests. According to 
Satake and Rudel (2007), evidence supporting this hypothesis has been found in West 
Africa (Fairhead and Leach 1995), Philippines (Walters 1997) and India (Rush 1991).   
Foster and Rosenzweig’s (2003) analysis also finds evidence for the forest 
scarcity hypothesis in India. They find that growing income and population lead to an 
increase in the aggregate demand for forest products. This demand, in the absence of 
imports, must be met by locally grown wood products; this, therefore, leads to an 
increase in forest area.   
An extension of Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) and an estimation of the impact 
of community forestry on the demand for fuelwood are provided by Bandyopadhyay 
and Shayamsunder (2004). In their analysis, they try to determine the factors that 
influence participation in community forestry and the impact of such participation on 
fuelwood consumption. They find that there is a positive correlation between fuelwood 
consumption and household participation in community forestry. They find that 
household participation is strongly correlated with scarcity. Factors that influence 
village participation in community forestry are proximity to forests, leadership and 
fuelwood dependence.  
 Finally, some authors have looked at changes in relative prices to explain the 
FT.  Barbier et al. (2010), based on the work of Alexander Mather, offer an approach to 
develop a more comprehensive theory of forest transition. According to them, factors 
that affect the transition of a country, such as relative land values, cannot be ignored. 
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Similarly, Foster and Rosenzswieg (2003) consider the average price of land in their 
analysis of land use. After including other factor prices such as the average price of 
labor, they find that increases in factor costs (which are rising since the 1960’s) could 
not be the cause of increases in forest area.  
The two radical policy programs suggested by Mather (2007), the Joint Forestry 
Program and the Social Forestry Program, explored in greater detail in the next section, 
are institutional responses to scarcity in forest products in India. These two forest 
policies focused on the needs of the local population and decentralization of forest 
resources. 
 Mather (2007) observes that the time period for Foster and Rosenzweig’s 
(2003) study, 1970–2000, is also the time period in which both the Social Forestry and 
JFM Programs were initiated. To understand the policy context to these programs, a 
brief historical background on Indian forest policy is provided. Figure IV.2 is a map of 
India with the different states and forest areas. 
 
History of Forestry Policy in India 
 
Colonial forest policy (1800–1947) 
State control of Indian forests in the pre-colonial period was restricted to certain 
products and specific instances (Bhat et al. 2001). Not much value was placed on this 
resource until well into the 19th century. With the depletion of oak forests in England 
and Ireland, teak grown in the Western Ghats (green areas in Kerala, Karnataka, Goa 
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and Maharashtra) region served as a durable substitute for shipbuilding timber (Guha 
1983). However, the movement towards a general policy of state control of forests 
gained momentum only in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Rapid expansion 
of the Indian railways led to an increase in the demand for railway sleepers and the 
realization that the forest resource is finite and, therefore, is to be administered. This, in 
turn, led to the establishment of The Forest Department (Guha and Gadgil 1989). 
 
 
Figure IV.2. Forest Areas in India 
Source: India State of the Forest Report 2011(Figure 2.6.1 Forest Cover Map of India, pg 17). Image 
reproduced from K.S. Srivastava (2012) “India’s Forest Cover Declines” Feb 8th 2012 Science and 
Environment Online Down to Earth, Reproduced with the permission of Science and Environment Online 
Down to Earth retrieved from http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/india-s-forest-cover-
declines?quicktabs_1=0 
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This began the large-scale state monopoly of forests, which gained legal 
credibility under the stringent provisions of the Indian Forest Act of 1878. The local 
populations, who depended on forests for a number of needs, were allotted a specific 
quota of timber and fuel. This quota led to the exclusion of the local agrarian population 
from the use of the forests. The forest dwellers’ access to the forest resource was looked 
upon as a privilege rather than a right (Guha 1983). 
Socially, the property rights of the forest dwellers diminished to a marginal and 
inflexible claim: physical access to forests and pasture was denied (Guha and Gadgil 
1989). This shift in management had ecological implications as well: species 
composition changed from mixed species into a single-species forest. These single-
species forests could no longer meet fuel, fodder and small timber needs of the local 
populations (Guha and Gadgil 1989). By 1947, according to Lal (1989), the percentage 
of area under reserved forests was 96.79% (Bhat et al. 2001). The forest dwellers’ right 
to forest products diminished due to colonial policies.  
 
Post-Colonial forest policy  
Independence initially did not lead to an increase in the property rights of the 
local population. The 1952 Forest Policy was very similar in spirit to The Forest Act of 
1878. It stated that village communities in no event should be permitted to use the forest 
at the expense of national interest. Emphasis was also placed on the conversion of 
“low”-value mixed forests into “high”-value mixed plantations. Scientific forestry was 
associated with rising industrial plantations (Saxena 1997). 
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Firewood and fuelwood, classified as minor forest products, were mainly 
ignored for a number of years. However, there was increasing demand for these 
products from individuals who had a stake in the forests. The National Agricultural 
Policy of 1976 directly addresses these needs. The aim of this policy was to provide for 
the fuelwood and fodder needs of the local dwellers (Saxena 1992a). Empirical 
evidence that the Social Forestry Program, an outcome of this policy, might be 
successful is provided by Foster and Rosenzweig (2003); empirical evidence from this 
study suggests that one pathway for FT may have been the raising of plantations for 
fuelwood. The Social Forestry Program and its possible impact on forest area are 
discussed in the following section. 
Though there were certain specific instances where community forestry were 
promoted, state control of national forests continued until the 1980’s. The major change 
in Indian forestry policy occurred in the 1980’s with the National Forest Policy when 
community requirements of fuelwood, fodder, minor forest produce and construction 
timber were given importance. This led to the creation of new institutions, a new form 
of governance which was supposed to lead to the creation of community property rights 
to forest produce (generally outside forests) under the Social Forestry Program and 
forest area under the JFM program. 
 
The Social Forestry Program 
The goal of the Social Forestry Program is to the meet the timber, fuelwood and 
fodder needs of the local population and, in the process, also regenerate and improve 
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tree cover on degraded and common lands (Puttaswamiah 2009). The concept of social 
forestry was proposed as early as 1897. However, real progress began to be made only 
in the 1980’s (Sharma 1993). The National Commission on Agriculture (NCA) in 1976 
provided the framework for the creation of the Social Forestry Program; the formal 
origins of the Social Forestry Program can be traced to this policy (Arnold 1991). The 
program further gained momentum with the setting up of the National Wasteland 
Development Board in 1985 (Sharma 1993). The Social Forestry Program is made up of 
the following components: 
 Farm Forestry:  This program encourages farmers to grow trees on the 
peripheries of their fields (Puttaswamiah 2009). The Farm Forestry program was 
also encouraged by the National Forest Policy of 1988. This policy advocates 
that, as far as possible, forest-based industries should obtain their raw materials 
by establishing direct links with farmers (Sharma and Kohli 2013). 
 Extension Forestry: the goal of this program is the reforestation of common 
lands. It promotes mixed forestry on common lands, the raising of shelter belts 
and planting trees along roads, railway lines and riverbanks (Puttaswamiah 
2009). 
 Reforestation of degraded forests: This component of the program encourages 
the growth of trees in degraded areas to meet the fuelwood needs and small 
timber needs of the local population (Puttaswamiah 2009). 
 Urban forestry or recreational forestry: Planting of trees in urban areas to meet 
the recreational needs of urban dwellers (Puttaswamiah 2009).  
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The Farm Forestry component of the Social Forestry Program is confined to 
activities undertaken by farmers, mainly on their own private lands (Saxena 1997). 
Whereas the remaining components of the program are on public lands, these 
components of the Social Forestry Program remained largely unsuccessful because they 
depended on voluntary contributions of labor and capital from local communities 
(Saxena and Ballabh 1995 in Rangan and Lane 2001). The property rights to the forest 
products for the poor among these local communities were not certain. The Forest 
Department continued to be extremely powerful. 
The Social Forestry Program was generally confined to village and private 
lands. The Social Forestry Program was not implemented on forest lands, except on a 
small scale in SIDA projects in Bihar and Orissa, as such lands were in the past used for 
producing timber (Saxena 1997). 
The Social Forestry Program basically tried to curb deforestation by providing 
incentives for growing forest products on non-forested lands. Afforested forest produce 
on these lands acted as a substitute to the products consumed in local areas. The goal of 
this program was to provide local populations with property rights to forest produce 
generally grown outside designated forest areas. 
The principal incentive provided by the state forest departments under the farm 
forestry program is subsidized by free seedlings. In certain instances, as in the case of 
West Bengal, degraded land was allotted to the poor for the growth of plantations. 
Market forces provided incentives for the growth of Farm Forestry. The scarcity 
of raw materials experienced by forest-based industries created a demand for forest 
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products (Foster and Rosenzweig 2003). The price of these products increased, 
providing an incentive for the growth of plantations. 
 
Evolution and patterns in the Social Forestry Program 
  According to Tiwary (1998), the Social Forestry Program received external 
funding from a number of sources including The World Bank, Danish International 
Development Assistance (DIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA), Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Further, according to Saxena and Ballabh (1995), there was an 
overall increase in area under tree crops (Rangan and Lane 2001). 
Initial publications of the State of Forest reports (published by the Forest Survey 
of India [FSI]) provide some information on the growth of plantations and afforestation. 
However, ever since the publication of the 2001 State of Forest Report, information on 
tree cover is provided instead. Tree cover is defined as an area of trees which are less 
than one hectare. If this area were more than one hectare, it would be considered as 
forest cover. Therefore, in this analysis the relationship between percentage changes in 
forest cover and tree cover will be examined.  
Both figures IV.3 and IV.4 present the increase in plantations since the first 
planning period; figure IV.3 presents the cumulative increase in plantation area in 
1000’s of hectares. Moreover, figure IV.4 represents the annual average area of 
plantations raised in the different planning periods. It is clear that area under plantations 
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increased rapidly since the 1980’s. This increase in plantation area is an increase in 
plantations due to The Social Forestry Program. 
 
 
Figure IV.3. Cumulative Increase in Plantation Area Raised by the Forest  
Department 
Source: State of Forest Report 1999 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV.4. Annual Average Increase in Plantation Area in Different Planning  
Periods 
Source: State of the Forest Report 1999 
 
The percentage of total geographical area under plantation cover (table IV.3) due to 
afforestation activities by the state forest departments is used as a measure of the 
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success of the Social Forestry Program. Among the larger states, based on percentages 
under the different components in table IV.4, the success of the Social Forestry Program 
in Haryana, Punjab, Gujarat, Karnataka and West Bengal might be due to the success of 
the farm forestry project in these regions (the states with the largest planted areas). 
These states are generally characterized by commercial and monetized agriculture 
(Saxena 1992a).   
 
Table IV.3. Percentage of Total Geographical Area under Plantation Area Across 
States (1999) 
States and   
Union 
Territories 
Total Area 
(Million 
Hectares) 
Area 
under 
Plantation 
Percentage 
of Area 
under 
Plantation 
(Million 
Hectares) 
Gujarat 19.600 2.980 15.204 
Haryana 4.420 0.743 16.804 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
5.570 0.719 12.916 
Karnataka 19.180 2.160 11.262 
Kerala 3.890 0.688 17.686 
Orissa 15.570 1.827 11.734 
Punjab 5.040 0.512 10.166 
Tamil Nadu 13.000 2.200 16.923 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
29.440 4.150 14.096 
West Bengal 8.870 1.150 12.965 
Source: Adapted from information in the State of the Forest Report 1999 
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According to Saxena (1992a), the supply of Eucalyptus, and hence a large 
percentage of the area under forest plantation, is dependent on market incentives. 
Supply from farmers in Haryana, Punjab and Gujarat was more price elastic than the 
supply from farmers in Karnataka and West Bengal (Puttaswamiah 2009). Eucalyptus 
 
Table IV.4. Percentages by Different Components of Social Forestry (Externally 
Aided) 
  
Village 
Woodlots 
Strips 
Plantations 
Reforestation 
of Degraded 
Forests 
Farm 
Forestry 
Gujarat 11.182 5.751 9.585 73.482 
Bihar 18.343 0.592 38.462 42.604 
Uttar Pradesh 8.075 0.621 0.000 91.304 
Andhra Pradesh 16.556 2.649 9.272 71.523 
Karnataka 16.779 2.685 0.000 80.537 
Rajasthan 3.361 3.361 16.807 76.471 
Himachal Pradesh 36.283 0.000 4.425 59.292 
Tamil Nadu 37.554 4.348 2.174 55.978 
West Bengal 6.452 21.505 16.129 55.914 
Kerala 16.471 2.353 0.000 81.176 
Orissa 34.247 0.457 24.658 40.639 
Maharashtra 41.975 3.704 0.000 54.321 
Haryana 17.647 14.706 23.529 44.118 
Jammu and Kashmir 11.364 6.818 38.636 43.182 
All India 19.964 4.053 12.314 63.674 
Source: converted into percentages table 1.2 :Area Brought under the Externally Aided Social Forestry 
Projects in India Statewise (Area in Thousand Hectares page 10, Puttaswamiah (2009), original source 
Forestry Statistics India (1995), (adopted from Compendium of Environmental Statistics (1997)). 
 
plantations, in these three states, were grown in regions where land productivity is high. 
These plantations were not served by a paper mill, or there were far too few paper mills 
 111 
 
in the area. In Karnataka, the land productivity on which the plantations were grown 
was not high. There were many paper mills to buy paper. In West Bengal, the 
Eucalyptus plantations were grown on degraded forests. In Haryana, Punjab, Gujarat 
and Karnataka, the Eucalyptus plantations were remote from forest areas (Saxena 
1992a) in Puttaswamiah (2009). The main incentive for growing Eucalyptus was market 
demand from forest-based industries. 
The tree species of choice in the farm forestry program was Eucalyptus (State of 
Forest Report 1999). The choice of this species indicates the conflict between the 
proposed goals of the program and the market incentives that motivated the local 
community. The main motivation for growing Eucalyptus was cash; it was not for 
meeting the fuel and fodder needs of the household. The reasons given for the growth of 
Eucalyptus include shortage of labor, falling returns to crops in Haryana and Punjab, 
uncertain production of groundnut in Gujarat, low productivity of Sorghum and food 
grain crops in Karnataka and, finally in Bengal, the lands were unsuitable for crops and 
the labor was required for wage work (Saxena 1992a). 
 The community forest components of the Social Forestry program had limited 
success in certain states. According to Saxena and Ballabh (1995), the community forest 
components depended on voluntary contributions of labor and capital from local 
communities (Rangan and Lane 2001). The planting of a single tree species also 
reduced the variety of non-timber forest products (NTFP). The poor had little incentive 
to take part in these projects (Rangan and Lane 2001). The rights to the forest produce 
were not clearly defined (Saxena 1997). 
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  Monetized agriculture was a necessary incentive for farm forestry. Village 
woodlots under the Extension Forestry component were developed in Orissa and 
Himachal Pradesh. Subsistence farmers, in states such as Orissa, Bihar and Madhya 
Pradesh, were mainly indifferent to the Farm Forestry Component (Saxena 1992a).  
Another indicator of the success of the Social Forestry Program is the percentage 
increase in plantation cover since the 1980’s. Table IV.5 is a list of states with the 
largest percentage increase in plantation cover since the 1980’s 
 
Table IV.5. States with the Largest Percentage Increase in Forest Area Since the 
1980’s 
  
Percentage increase 
since 1980 
Andhra Pradesh 1583.339 
Gujarat 1421.114 
Jammu and Kashmir 1545.568 
Maharashtra 1481.792 
Source: Adapted from the State of Forest Report 1999 
 
.  
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Once again, the smaller states and union territories often have a percentage 
increase of more than 1000 percent. States and union territories with increases in forest 
area greater than 1000 percent are included.  Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and 
Jammu and Kashmir are the relatively larger states that experienced the largest increases 
in plantation area. Based on table IV.5, the Farm Forestry component in Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Jammu and Kashmir was large. In Jammu and 
Kashmir, the increase in plantation cover was due to the reforestation of degraded 
forests (Puttaswamiah 2009). 
 
Comparison between forest area and indicators of growth of the Social Forestry 
Program 
Table IV.6 examines the relationship between the percentage decadal rate of 
change in forest and plantation cover (1990–2000) due to afforestation schemes 
undertaken by the government across the different states and union territories. The 
correlation coefficients are positive and similar across both indicators of growth in Social 
Forestry.  
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Table IV.6. Percentage Increase in Plantation Area and Percentage Increase in 
Forest Area (1990–1999) 
  
Percentage 
change in 
Plantation 
area 
Percentage 
change in 
Forest 
area 
Andhra Pradesh 53.238 -8.325 
Arunachal Pradesh 38.608 0.478 
Assam 33.020 -9.663 
Bihar 22.089 -1.738 
Goa 34.649 -4.077 
Gujarat 50.674 10.096 
Haryana 62.978 41.598 
Himachal Pradesh 42.205 -2.255 
Jammu and Kashmir 52.190 0.083 
Karnataka 30.942 0.838 
Kerala 21.176 1.686 
Madhya Pradesh 40.852 -1.032 
Maharashtra 80.739 5.601 
Meghalaya 50.711 -1.836 
Mizoram 39.209 -2.852 
Nagaland 30.412 -0.805 
Orissa 47.889 -0.174 
Punjab 29.295 17.422 
Rajasthan 59.316 6.488 
Sikkim 59.406 -0.192 
Tamil Nadu 52.837 -3.730 
Tripura 45.532 7.311 
Uttar Pradesh 46.636 0.559 
West Bengal 54.166 -0.383 
Andaman &Nicobar 37.077 -0.237 
Dader and Nager Haveli 48.148 -1.485 
Source: State of the Forest Report 1999 
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Table IV.7. Relationship between Percentage Increase in Plantation 
Area and Forest Area (2000–2007) 
 
 
Percentage  change in 
Tree Cover 
Percentage change in 
Forest Area 
Andhra Pradesh -0.177 0.044 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.086 -0.035 
Assam -0.209 0.095 
Bihar -0.321 0.266 
Chhattisgarh 0.205 -0.032 
Delhi 1.875 0.416 
Goa 3.468 0.374 
Gujarat 0.984 0.132 
Haryana -0.026 0.404 
Himachal Pradesh 0.696 0.136 
Jammu & Kashmir 1.796 0.141 
Jharkhand 0.134 0.016 
Karnataka -0.251 0.087 
Kerala 1.392 0.291 
Madhya Pradesh 0.142 0.032 
Maharashtra 0.115 0.125 
Manipur 0.784 -0.034 
Meghalaya 2.382 0.048 
Mizoram 0.547 0.173 
Nagaland 2.843 -0.037 
Orissa 0.034 -0.004 
Punjab 0.078 0.022 
Rajasthan 0.575 0.103 
Sikkim 0.679 0.061 
Tamil Nadu -0.125 0.112 
Tripura 1.243 -0.090 
Uttar Pradesh 0.033 0.331 
Uttarakhand 0.477 0.049 
West Bengal -0.276 0.250 
A. & N. Islands -0.416 0.006 
Chandigarh 4.000 0.308 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 0.019 -0.028 
Source: Compendium of Environmental Statistics 2009 and State of  
Forest Reports 2001 and 2007 
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Table IV.7 examines the relationship between percentage rate of change in forest 
and tree cover (2000–2007) across the different states. While the increase in tree cover 
not only is due to the success of the Social Forestry scheme, this is the only easily 
accessible plausible measure. The correlations between both indicators of progress of the 
Social Forestry Program (plantation cover by the Forest Department and tree cover) and 
percentage change in forest cover are very similar and positive. The correlation 
coefficients between changes in tree cover and forest cover and change in plantation area 
and tree cover are 0.280 and 0.276, respectively, although these correlation coefficients 
are only significantly different from zero at a 20% level. Correlation is only a measure of 
association. It is not a measure of causation between the variables. A far more rigorous 
measure would be necessary to establish causation. 
It is clear that, since the initiation of the Social Forestry Program, there has been 
an increase in plantation area. Further, growth in plantation cover might have a positive 
relationship with an increase in forest area. This could be due to two reasons, firstly, forest 
plantations acted as a substitute of raw materials for forest-based industries. And 
secondly, trees outside forests and plantations addressed the needs of the local population. 
A number of criticisms have been leveled against the farm forestry program. 
One of drawbacks of the social forestry scheme is that the Farm Forestry component of 
the program attracts more commercial forestry rather than the growing of trees for 
fodder and fuelwood (Puttaswamiah 2009). Therefore, one of the primary causes of 
deforestation was not addressed by the program. The National Commission on 
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Agriculture hoped that farmers would grow trees for meeting fuel and fodder needs. 
However, trees were planted more for sale as poles and pulpwood rather than for 
meeting subsistence needs of the village population. Hence, the Social Forestry Program 
did not address the fodder and fuel needs of the local population. It promoted 
monoculture; trees were grown for their commercial rather than their ecological value. 
Eucalyptus, a non-native species, was generally found to be the most popular species. 
The Social Forestry Program seems to have addressed the needs of forest-based 
industries rather than the fuelwood, fodder and small timber needs of the local 
population. 
There is also an opposing view that suggests that too much emphasis was placed 
on fuelwood and not enough emphasis on the fodder needs. The extraction of fuelwood 
might not be the primary cause of deforestation. According to Saxena (1997), forest 
dwellers often look for alternate sources for fuel. The impact of the Social Forestry 
scheme on the supply of fuelwood is not clear.  A study in 2001 on the fuelwood 
demand and supply in India found that 72% percentage of the rural Indian population 
still depended on noncommercial energy (fuelwood, dung cake and crop residue) as 
their primary source of energy. However, the sources for the supply of this fuelwood 
have changed (Pandey 2002). The primary source is trees outside forest. The National 
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) survey is a national survey; however, 
a study by Jaiswal and Bhattacharya (2013) analyzing the fuelwood dependence  among 
villagers near Suhelwa Wildlife sanctuary found that nearly 87% of the households 
depended on the forest as their primary source of fuel. 
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Market incentives, combined with subsidized seedlings provided by the Social 
Forestry Program, led to large areas being afforested under the farm forestry program, 
mainly on private lands. There was a large demand for forest-based raw materials. This 
demand could not be met by forest lands; companies were not allowed to raise 
plantations and therefore had to rely on farmers to supply these products. Certainty in 
demand for forest produce and property rights to land areas seem to be the largest 
motives for the popularity of the farm forestry component of the Social Forestry 
Program. 
Further, there is no evidence to suggest that increases in forested areas under the 
Social Forestry Program were due to community participation. Community woodlots 
planting was undertaken by the state forest departments; in the process, village lands 
were transferred to the forest departments. The limited success of the community 
woodlots in certain regions might be due to the transfer of village lands to the forest 
departments (Saxena 1997). 
The Social Forestry Program led to large increases in planted area. Figure IV.2 
suggests that areas afforested by the Forest Department increased rapidly after the 
1980’s. However, deforestation continued to take place. The Social Forestry Program 
did not fully address the NTFP needs of the local population, and this could have been a 
continued source of deforestation. The program failed to involve local communities in 
conservation (the non-farm forestry components of the Social Forestry Program). There 
was also lack of clarity on who owned the lands. The rules for distribution of the forest 
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produce were not well defined. This further deterred any community involvement in the 
Social Forestry Program (Saxena 1997). 
 
The JFM Program 
The Joint Forest Management (JFM) Program was initiated as a community 
conservation policy. The need for community participation was recognized by the 
National Forest Policy of 1988. This policy facilitated people’s participation in forestry. 
Under this program, local communities are encouraged to actively engage in the 
development and participation of the forest lands. In 1990, a circular was sent out to the 
state forest department, outlining the framework for the implementation of the JFM 
program. Bhat et al. (2001), Kumar (2002) and Mather (2007) suggest that the JFM 
could have halted the process of deforestation. 
The Government of India defines JFM as a forest management strategy under 
which the government (represented by the Forest Department) and the village 
community enter into an agreement to jointly protect and manage forest lands adjoining 
villages and to share responsibilities and benefits (Damodaran and Engel 2003). 
The framework for the JFM program is based on a pilot project carried out in 
Arbari in Midanpore in West Bengal in the 1970’s. The local communities in these 
regions were involved in the protection of degraded forest lands dominated by Sal trees; 
in return for their services, they were promised twenty-five percent of the timber 
revenue from the final harvest (De 2003). 
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 In the JFM program, local communities (generally known as village committees) 
form a partnership with the government to manage the resource and share the cost. The 
government is still considered as the owner of the resource, whereas village committees 
are considered to be the users. Local NGOs play the role of intermediaries between the 
government and village committees. The role of the village committees is to safeguard 
the forest resource from illegal exploitation and degradation by protecting the forest 
from fire, grazing and illegal harvesting. For these services, the village committees 
receive non-timber forest products and a part of the revenue from the sale of timber 
products.  The JFM program differs from the Social Forestry Program; it allows local 
populations access to forest products grown within the designated forest areas. The local 
population is now granted user rights to forest products grown within designated forest 
areas. 
 At the time of the initiation of the Social Forestry Program, administrators were 
heavily influenced by Hardin’s Tragedy of the commons. Nationalization or 
privatization were considered to be the only regime that led to efficient outcomes. 
Common Property regimes were not considered to be efficient (Saxena 1997). 
The JFM program provides three types of products to village committees. The 
types of forest produce include immediate products like NTFP, grass, fuelwood, 
intermediate products from thinning and cultural operations and final products such as 
timber. The national JFM guidelines were issued in 1990; 22 states are implementing 
the program (Ministry for Environment and Forests). According to the Study on Joint 
Forest Management conducted by the Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI) for 
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Ministry of Environment and Forests (p. 14) in 2000, it was found that the overarching 
goals found in the 1990 National Resolution on the JFM are: 
i. Providing an enabling mechanism for participation of local communities and a 
platform for NGO participation  
ii. Facilitating institution building and allowed flexibility in their formation 
iii. Eliminating the involvement of commercial interests and middlemen in 
the benefit-sharing mechanism 
iv. Providing forest usufructuary benefits to participating communities 
v. Providing for wage employment to local communities for some forest-related 
work 
vi. Allowing for plantation of indigenous, multi-purpose species of trees and even 
grasses, shrubs and medicinal herbs 
vii. Ensuring that the Forest Department only harvests in accordance with a 
working scheme prepared in consultation with local communities 
The JFM Program gives village committees conditional access to a number of 
NTFP products and timber. The organization and conditions for membership vary 
across the different states. There are a number of variations in the JFM model. These 
variations are a result of differences in geography, resource base, socio-economic status, 
cultural diversity and the pressures on the forest. For example, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, and Orissa distributed 100% of the fuelwood harvested to the village 
committees, in Arunachal Pradesh it was 50% and West Bengal 25% (TERI 2000). 
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While there are many case studies of various facets of JFM and Social Forestry 
that provide useful insights into the micro-level aspects of the working of these 
programs, there are also regional studies (Bhat et al. 2001; Murali et al. 2002) that 
suggest that the JFM program could play a positive role in forest regeneration.  
 
Growth of the JFM program in terms of hectares covered and the number of village 
forest committees and states 
Figure IV.5 shows the growth in the JFM program in terms of hectares managed 
by the village committees. Though the JFM program began in 1990, data on the areas 
covered is available only since the end of 1990’s. By the year 2000, JFM covered an 
area of 10.25 million hectares; this accounted for 39.22 percent of the open forest area 
(10% to 40% crown cover (Khare et al. 2000)) of 261,310 sq kms in India. Village 
committees in the country numbered 36,130 in 2002: JFM had covered 14.09 million 
hectares spread over 63,618 village committees in 27 states, about 50% of the degraded 
or open area (Murali et al. 2002, Damodaran and Engle 2003). By 2004, JFM covered 
17.33 million hectares spread over 84,832 village committees and by 2010, the JFM 
program covered 22.96 million hectares managed by 105,323 village committees across 
28 states and one union territory. 
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Figure IV.5.  Forest Area under the JFM Program 
Source: The Ministry of Environment and Forests Annual Reports (2001,2008,2009)and Compendiums of 
Environmental statistics (2003,2007,2013). State of Forest Reports(1999) and Damodaran and Engel 
(2003), Govt of India (2002) 
 
The growth in JFM program has decreased since the end of the 2000’s. This 
might be due to the lack of degraded forest or the lack of legislation that extended the 
JFM project to non-degraded forest areas. During this period, the forest cover of India 
stabilized as seen in figure IV.1.  
The original JFM framework was criticized by Saxena (1992b) on a number of 
grounds. Legally, the status of the JFM committees was not defined. Moreover, there 
was a lack of policies that ensured the participation of women. 
The state forest departments wielded too much power. This was exhibited in the 
monopsonistic (single buyer) power by government agencies for marketing NTFPs, lack 
of specific imbalance in power between the state forest department and communities, no 
special training for forest officers and no change in administrative ethos and restricted 
access by the village committees to NTFP and forest products. 
The goals and policies of the State forest department were not well defined. 
There was a lack of coordination between JFM and other departments and programs. 
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The working plans of the state forest departments did not clearly integrate the JFM 
programs. While greater access to forest products could have provided incentives for 
forest conservation, the structure of the JFM program creates certain disincentives. The 
poor are net losers in these projects and have no incentives to protect the forests (Singh 
2002). According to Behera and Engel (2006), who use Williamson’s (2000) framework 
to analyze the efficiency of the JFM programs, the lack of transparency in the transfer of 
rights (for example legal ambiguity) creates disincentives for community participation. 
Further, their analysis also finds the information asymmetry and the rent-seeking 
activities of the state forest department undermine the efficiency of the system. 
In 2002, The Government of India issued additional guidelines to promote 
greater uniformity in the implementation of the JFM program. These guidelines also 
addressed some of the observed deficiencies in the framework. The 2002 guidelines 
with regard to property rights led to the following amendments. Firstly, in an attempt to 
strengthen the property rights legal backup was provided to JFM committees. The 
management of the forest resources was also made inclusive by specifying certain 
quotas for women. Thirdly, by extending the JFM program to good forest areas, the 
property rights of the villages were now extended to these areas. The property rights of 
the forestry resources are now extended to include self-initiated groups, The 2002 
guidelines focus on the legal relationship between the forest department and the village 
committees, the relationship between panchayats (village self-government councils) and 
the JFM committees and NTFP. 
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Studies also found evidence that political structures were crucial in the 
functioning of the JFM program (Lele 2000). Lawbuary 1999 and Saxena and Sarin 
1999) find that no specific mechanisms to protect the private (excludable) goods are 
often captured by members of a village elite that might have already captured the 
decentralized village – level forest institutions Kumar (2002). The arrangements of the 
JFM program do not allow for the employment of the village committees. The state still 
exercises a considerable amount of power (Lele 2000). 
The new guidelines issued by the government addressed certain aspects of the 
program. However, these guidelines did not specifically address the perceived 
deficiencies in the role of the state government except to state that the political 
neutrality of the village committee must be maintained. No provisions were made for 
the training of forest officers in the ethos of community forestry. The monopsony nature 
of the forest agencies was also not addressed.  The de facto power of the Forest 
Departments actually leads to insecure property rights to forest resources. 
 
Comparison between increases in forest area and areas under the Joint Forest 
Management Program 
A large proportion of India’s forests are under the JFM program. The impact of 
the program’s effect on potential property rights on the forest resources is ambiguous. 
Mather (2007) and Bhat et al. (2001) suggest that the JFM program might have 
preserved forests. However, Puyravaud et al. (2010) suggest that natural forests 
continue to disappear at the rate of 1% annually. 
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Table IV.8. Percentage Changes in Areas under JFM and Forest  
and Open Areas (2004–2011) 
States 
Percentage 
Change in Area 
under JFM 
Percentage 
Change in 
Forest Area 
Percentage 
change in 
area under 
open forest 
Andhra Pradesh -19.44 2.56 -3.72 
Arunachal Pradesh -69.94 -0.09 -2.38 
Assam -32.85 -0.31 0.07 
Bihar 158.78 0.56 35.25 
Chhattisgarh 16.59 -0.46 -3.12 
Goa 610.00 0.00 7.59 
Gujarat 147.44 2.92 5.07 
Haryana 7.14 0.10 5.94 
Himachal Pradesh 45.97 0.25 -6.75 
Jammu & Kashmir -19.26 0.09 -10.28 
Jharkhand 157.79 -0.66 -4.55 
Karnataka 159.31 1.12 8.25 
Kerala 1.48 -0.02 8.91 
Madhya Pradesh 21.59 0.09 3.27 
Maharashtra 89.45 -0.05 10.49 
Meghalaya 0.00 -0.03 -28.20 
Mizoram 317.76 0.81 4.19 
Manipur -16.41 0.41 -3.89 
Nagaland 78.50 2.78 -9.99 
Orissa 29.73 -2.54 1.47 
Punjab* 252.87 0.30 23.11 
Rajasthan 107.03 6.27 1.64 
Sikkim 14653.00 0.47 -18.08 
Tamil Nadu 61.74 0.06 -2.34 
Tripura 275.36 1.33 1.82 
Uttar Pradesh -16.68 -2.40 0.06 
Uttarakhand -88.29 -0.06 -7.89 
West Bengal 6.91 0.01 -15.43 
Sources: State of the Forest Reports (2005 and 2011) and Compendiums of Environmental Statistics 
(2007 and 2013). 
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Table IV.8 examines the relationship between the percentage increase in forest 
area (2005 to 2011) and the percentage increase in areas under JFM (2004 to 2010). 
Since the JFM primarily focused on degraded areas, the relationship between percentage 
change in forest cover and percentage change in area under JFM are examined. This is 
mainly to take into account the changes in guidelines in the policy. 
The correlation coefficients between these two indicators of forestry (forest 
cover and open forest cover) and areas under JFM are 0.0065 and -0.2725, respectively. 
These values are associated with p-values of 0.9738 and 0.1606. This suggests that the 
increase in JFM areas has very little association with the increase in forest areas. 
However, the stronger negative association between areas under the JFM program and 
open forest area suggests that the JFM program has led to a regeneration of the open 
forest. 
 
Conclusion 
The success of the Social Forestry Program in increasing plantation cover is 
generally well accepted (Saxena 1997). The dependence of forest-based industries on 
timber directly from natural forests has generally waned. One of the reasons is the 
supply of wood from Farm Forestry and also the supply of wood from exports. The 
Farm Forestry Component of the Social Forestry Program was successful in providing 
raw materials for forest-based industry. This increase in plantation cover could be the 
main reason for the stabilization of the forest cover rather than the regeneration of 
natural forests (Puyravaud et al. 2010). 
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The impact of the Social Forestry Program on NTFP products, especially 
fuelwood supply, is more ambiguous. Recent NCEAR and Foster and Rosenzweig’s 
(2003) estimate suggest there could be a decrease in dependence on forest reserves for 
fuelwood. This could be based on both the availability of alternate substitutes, one of 
these alternatives being trees outside forests. However, other studies suggest that 
extraction of fuelwood continues to be one of the major causes of deforestation. 
Kumar (2002), Mather (2007) and Bhat et al. (2001) suggest that the JFM 
program might have led to forest regeneration and hence the forest transition. There is a 
contemporaneous overlapping of the initiation in the JFM program of forest cover 
stabilization.  
The government’s focus shifted away from the revenues of the state forest 
departments towards the needs of the local populations. The impact of this proposed 
decentralization in forest policy on the forest transition is ambiguous. Most of the 
studies that suggest that the JFM program plays a role in forest regeneration are 
confined to specific geographical areas. The results of these studies cannot be 
generalized. There is considerable disparity in the power structures and implementation 
of the JFM program across states. This might play a role in its success. 
Clarity of property rights, the incentives provided by market forces and certainty 
in demand for products could possibly be the largest motivators for the success of the 
Farm Forestry component of the Social Forestry Program. And conversely, the lack of 
clarity in property rights, the continued domination of the forest department and 
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government agencies might hamper the effectiveness of both the community component 
of the Social Forestry and Joint Forest Management Programs.  
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION 
 
All three essays in this thesis are concerned with the relationship between 
environmental degradation and welfare at the macro level. This analysis examines 
support for theoretical frameworks that attempt to explain the relationship between 
indicators of economic development and environmental degradation. It is an attempt to 
examine the empirical support for environmental theories that suggest that increases in 
welfare of a region provide incentives for increases in environmental quality. 
The contribution of the first essay is to examine the relationship between 
agricultural extent and increases in agricultural productivity. One of the explanations for 
the forest transition theory is the Borlaug Hypothesis. The Borlaug hypothesis can be 
considered within the framework of Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s theory. There have been 
many studies that examine the linkages between income and deforestation: these studies 
are interested in providing an empirical verification of the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC) hypothesis. Another contribution is the linking of AK literature with 
empirical EKC studies. Angelsen and Kaimowitz’s analysis divides the causes of 
deforestation into underlying and immediate causes of deforestation. EKC regression 
analysis provides indicators and measures of these underlying causes of deforestation. 
These indicators are used, within AK’s framework, to test certain implications. 
Combining the empirical framework of the EKC (specifically Barbier’s (2001) 
specification) and the theoretical framework of AK, we are able to provide  an empirical 
 131 
 
test for AK’s theory on the effect of advances in agricultural change on forest area. 
Therefore, the first essay is in essence a synthesis of two broader frameworks. The 
theoretical and empirical framework of the EKC hypothesis examines the causes and 
economic incentives for deforestation. 
Specifically, the first essay is concerned with explaining whether increases in 
agricultural productivity lead to incentives for reforestation. Easily accessible macro-
level data are used to provide empirical support. These data are frequently used to 
provide empirical verification of the EKC hypothesis. 
Although the empirical EKC literature focuses on the relationship between 
income and measures of environmental degradation such as pollution emissions, 
pesticide use and deforestation, its theoretical construct is concerned with the causal 
relationships between economic development and environmental degradation. Does 
economic development provide incentives for increases in environmental quality? 
This is at its heart a causal question. This question provided the motivation for 
the second essay. The second essay is, therefore, an exploration into causation; 
however, it is tested empirically within the context of the EKC. A methodological tool, 
the DAG approach, is offered to reveal better insights into the nature of causation 
between variables. This methodology focuses on providing empirical support for 
particular theoretical definition of causality provided by Hume, the manipulative 
definition of causality rooted in contemporaneous time. The results of this approach are 
combined and contrasted with the Hume predictive definition of causality, empirically 
tested using the Granger Causality approach. It is hoped that the insights gained from 
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both approaches provide a more complete picture of the nature of causality between 
variables. The DAG approach provides support for a direct causal relationship between 
income and pollution emissions. There is evidence to suggest that changing values of 
income lead to a change in the values of pollution emissions. Frequently employed 
datasets are used in this analysis.  
The empirical techniques employed in this second essay are similar to the 
techniques employed in the first essay. Both essays deal with panel data across countries 
over sufficiently lengthy periods of time. The relatively lengthy periods of time suggest 
that time series issues such as the stationarity of the variables is of concern. Therefore, 
stationarity tests are carried out in both analyses. Further, time-series issues are closely 
related with establishing the causal relationship between variables. 
The third and final essay is an exploration of the forest transition theory in the 
context of India. This analysis is closely linked with the first essay. Both essays are 
concerned with incentives for the forest transition. They both operate within theoretical 
frameworks for deforestation that owe a lot to the contributions of Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz’s theories on deforestation. 
The third essay is also based on Alexander Mather’s work on the forest 
transition and particularly on the Asian forest transition. Evidence for various theories 
for forest transition is explored. On the basis of Mather’s work, greater emphasis is 
placed on the two governmental programs: The Social Forestry Program and The Joint 
Forest Management Program. The objective is to examine whether growth in 
 133 
 
institutions and the move towards decentralization provide incentives for forest 
regeneration. 
Empirical analysis is hampered by the lack of availability of data on these 
programs. Accessible and available data are used to examine the support for various 
theories of forest transition. The role of these and their role in the most plausible theory 
for forest transition are examined. Market forces and certainty seem to be the main 
forces driving the forest transition in India. However, government policy seems to have 
played a role in addressing these needs. The impact of decentralization appears to be 
ambiguous. 
While the relationship between the second and the third essay might not be 
immediately apparent, both essays are based on macro theoretical frameworks that 
examine the relationship between economic incentives and environmental quality. The 
forest transition theory is also closely linked to the EKC for deforestation. 
In conclusion, this thesis tries to provide empirical support for theoretical 
frameworks in Environmental Economics. The data employed for this study are macro-
level datasets. The gathering of appropriate intermediate and micro-level data would 
provide the ability to test certain implications of these theoretical frameworks. This 
would strengthen the empirical basis for these theories. However, certain broad trends 
that might be useful for policy analysis such as the difference in impact of the various 
crops on agricultural land use and the unidirectional relationship from income to 
emissions might help guide policy. 
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APPENDIX I  
ANGELSEN AND KAIMOWITZ’S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
 The AK framework begins with assuming that there exists a production function 
(A.I.1) Y = αF(N, A) 
where Y is the production function and  N and A refer to the efficient levels of the two 
factors of production, labor and land. As in AK we assume that the production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale. This implies that the parameter, α, is a measure of 
pure yield, increasing technical change. The efficient levels of labor and land are 
actually defined by the functions N = εL and A = βH, where L is the total number of 
labor units utilized (for e.g., Man hours) and H is the physical number of land units 
utilized (for e.g., acres). The variables β and ε,  both greater than 1, refer to the state of 
technology parameters associated with labor and land, so that as these variables 
decrease, efficiency increases. 
The resulting yield function can be expressed in terms of Q, yield per efficient 
unit of land as a function of n, the efficiency units of labor per efficiency units of land. 
(A.I.2)     Q = f(n), Q =
Y
A
= 
Y
βH
,  n ≡
N
A
 =
εL
βH
=
ε  
β
l. l =
L
H
, fn > 0 and  fnn < 0.  
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Technological Change at the Micro Level 
 
The subsistence model 
 In AK’s subsistence model, it is assumed that each farmer wants to generate a 
fixed amount of income I that meets their basic needs. The subsistence model may arise 
in three situations. The first situation is a condition in which the farmer’s only desire is 
to consume a certain fixed amount of goods and services. The second situation arises 
when there are certain norms that state that any surplus the farmer generates must be 
shared. And the third and final condition arises when the output markets are not 
functioning properly. The third condition does not allow farmers to sell their produce 
and convert it into other types of consumer goods and services. 
 AK assumes that the area dedicated to agriculture forms a circle around a village 
and the outer limits of this circle is denoted by be. The farm gate price is (p − tb), 
where b is the distance from the farm to the center of the village in kilometers and t is 
the measure of transport costs per acre. Further, it is assumed that the amount labor 
input per hectare in efficiency units is also fixed; n = n, farmers cannot sell more than a 
fixed amount of labor L0  at a fixed wage rate w.  The distance from the farm to the 
center of the village is denoted by b. The farmer’s problem is to minimize effort subject 
to constraints on the minimum amount of output and a certain fixed amount of labor L0 
at a wage rate w: 
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(A.I.3) Min∫ nβε−1
be
0
hbdb + L0  subject to∫ (p − tb)αf(n)βhbdb + wL0  =
be
0
I; h ≡ 2π/K. 
Here K is the number of households in the village; therefore the expression h = 2π/K 
represents the share of the circle available for each household.  
 In this model, with n fixed, both pure yield increasing technological change and 
labor-intensive technological advances will increase forest area, because the same 
income can be obtained from a smaller agricultural area. However, the labor-saving 
technological change will not change the rate of deforestation in this model; the only 
change is that the effort required to reach the subsistence level now decreases. 
 
A perfect market (open economy) model 
 Assumptions under the perfect market open economy model are diametrically 
opposite to the subsistence model. In this model it is assumed that farmers can sell any 
amount of produce at the market price. There are no constraints on labor either, and the 
farmer is assumed to be indifferent between working on the farm or off the farm. 
Further, both family labor and non-family labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes for 
each other. The assumptions under the perfect market open economy model enable us to 
analyze decisions from a profit-making perspective. In the perfect market (open 
economy) model, the maximization condition is as follows:  
(A.I.4)              (p − tb)αf(n)βhb − wL 
  The first order conditions that emerge from this maximization problem are 
equation A.I.4, marginal returns from labor must equal the marginal returns or profit 
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from selling the product, and A.I.5 which represents the condition that it is profitable for 
a farmer to expand the agricultural frontier until land rents are zero: 
(A.I.5)  (p − tb)αfn = w 
(A.I.6)  (p − tb)αf − w/β−1 =0. 
 In this model, pure yield increasing or labor-saving technological progress 
(changes in α and ε) makes agriculture at the frontier more profitable and therefore leads 
to an increase in deforestation. However, labor-intensive technologies have no effect on 
deforestation (changes in β). 
 
Technological Change at the Macro Level 
 The following models describe technological change at the macro level. The 
open economy model presented above can be viewed as a special case of the macro-
level model, where changes in labor demand or output supply resulting from 
technological change are too small to influence wages or output prices. The 
macroeconomic models allow prices and wages to be endogenous. These two cases are 
presented below. In these models the agricultural sector consists of extensive and 
intensive sectors. 
 The basic idea between equations in these models is similar to the perfectly 
competitive model. The incentive once again is to maximize profit. 
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A model with endogenous wages 
 The model with endogenous wages makes the following assumptions. Firstly, 
the output prices are fixed. Secondly, the sector uses two inputs, land and labor, and 
finally, the total amount of labor is fixed in one of the sectors and not in the other. 
Additional land is perhaps brought into production, however, at an increasing cost.  
 The first order conditions for profit maximization in each sector in this model 
are similar to those derived within the open economy framework. However, an 
additional condition needs to be specified to account for the fixed labor supply. This 
condition creates the fixed labor supply. Farmers add labor in farm production as long 
as the value of the increased input is higher than the cost of labor: 
(A.I.7)  piεjαi fn
j
− w = 0; j = i, e, 
where j refers to the sector involved (i = intensive, e = extensive). 
 The amount of land in the intensive sector is fixed  Hi = H
i
. Deforestation is 
related only to the expansion of agricultural land in the extensive sector. The first order 
conditions in this sector are therefore similar to the open market economy. The 
extensive sector expands up to the point where land rent is zero, 
(A.I.8) (p − tbe  )αef e − wle be
−1
 =0. 
 Equation A.I.8 demonstrates that the total labor supply is fixed and allocated 
between two sectors (demand = supply); this condition is specified to ensure that there 
is full employment and the same wage in the two sectors. 
(A.I.9)  L = Le + Li ; Le = ∫ le 
be
0
hbdb, h = 2π; Li = liH
i
 . 
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 It is further assumed that employment in agriculture is small compared to rest of 
the economy. These four equations determine the labor inputs per hectare (li, le), the 
wage rate (w) and the outer edge of cultivation (be). The following table presents the 
effect of the various types of technological change in this sector. 
 
Table A.I.1.  Effect of Technological Change on Deforestation in a Model with 
Endogenous Wages 
Type of technological 
change 
Intensive sector Extensive sector 
Pure yield increasing 
technological 
change (α) 
 Decrease Increase 
Labor-intensive 
technological 
progress(β) 
Decrease Decrease 
 Labor-saving 
technological 
change (ε) 
Increase Increase 
Source: Table 6.1 (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2001) pg. When does technological change in agriculture 
promote deforestation?” D.R. Lee and C. B. Barret eds. in Tradeoffs or synergies?: agricultural 
intensification, economic development and the environment, reproduced with the permission of CAB 
International, Wallingford, U.K. 
  
The effects of technological change depend on the type and the sector. In the case of the 
intensive sector, both yield increasing and labor-intensive technological progress will 
reduce deforestation. In the case of labor-saving technological progress, labor will be 
relocated from the intensive sector to the extensive sector, increasing deforestation. 
 161 
 
 In the extensive sector both yield increasing and labor-saving technological 
progress lead to an increase in deforestation. However, labor-intensive technological 
progress will simulate forest conversion. 
 
A model with endogenous output price 
 In this model, AK assumes that the wage rate is exogenous. Changes in 
agricultural output induced by changes in technological changes are large enough to 
affect prices. Both the intensive as well as the extensive sector produce food for the 
same market. 
The first three conditions of this model are identical to those of the previous 
model. However, wages rather than prices are endogenous. The equation for labor 
market equilibrium is now replaced with the condition for output market equilibrium, 
and it states that supply must equal demand: 
(A.I.10) αif iβiH
i
+ ∫ αe
be
0
f eβehbdb − ΥE(p) = 0. 
 Demand is a function of price and this is represented by 𝐸(𝑝), and γ is a shift 
parameter, which can be used to study changes in demand. Supply is represented by the 
expression αif iβiH
i
+ ∫ αe
be
0
f eβehbdb, the expression αif iβiH
i
 represents quantity 
supplied by the intensive sector, and the term ∫ αe
be
0
f eβe represents quantity supplied 
by the extensive sector. 
  Any type of technological progress in the intensive sector will lead to an 
increase in production; this in turn will cause a downward pressure on prices, and 
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therefore reduce land expansion in the extensive sector. Once again, in the extensive 
sector, labor intensive technological changes will reduce deforestation. The effect of 
pure yield increasing and labor-saving technologies in the extensive sector cannot be 
predicted by theory alone. If product demand is inelastic and the extensive sector has a 
high share of total output deforestation will be reduced. In other cases it will increase. 
The effect of a change in the technology on the agricultural frontier is derived on the 
basis of the first order conditions associated with each model. These results are 
summarized in table II.2. 
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APPENDIX II 
STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION TESTS 
 
Stationarity Tests 
 
The Levin Lin Chu test 
 The null hypothesis under the Levin Lin Chu (LLC) (2002) test states that each 
of the series contain a unit root or are non-stationary versus an alternative hypothesis 
that each of the series are stationary. The test is carried out in three steps. In the first 
step an augmented Dickey Fuller test is run for the following equation for each of the 
cross-sections. 
(A.II.1)  Δyit=ρiyi,t−1 +∑ θiLΔyi,t−L
Pi
L=1 + αmidmt + εit , m=1,2,3 
 In the second step, two auxiliary regressions are run to obtain orthogonal 
residuals these two regressions are represented by the following equations: 
(A.II.2)   Δyit on Δyi,t−L and dmt  to obtain the residuals e
^
it and 
(A.II.3)    yi,t−1on Δyi,t−L and  dmt to get residuals vi,t−1
^ . 
 In the third step the residuals are standardized by dividing by the standardized 
error from each of the individual Dickey Fuller tests. This step is then completed by 
running the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: 
(A.II.4)  e−it = ρv
−
i,t−1 + ε
−
it 
where the null hypothesis is ρ = 0. This test is said to perform well when N lies between 
10 and 250 and T lies between 5 and 250 (Nell and Zimmerman 2011). 
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Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test 
 This test is less restrictive than the LLC test. In the LLC test it is assumed that 
the parameter ρ is homogeneous across  all  the cross-sections. This test can be 
considered as a generalization of the LLC statistic; it allows the parameter ρ to vary 
across individuals. The null hypothesis states that all individuals follow a unit root 
process: 
(A.II.5) H0:ρi =0 for all i 
 The alternate hypothesis allows some of the individuals, though not all, to have 
unit roots or be non-stationary. Both the LLC tests and the IPS tests vary from size 
distortions when N is either too small or too large relative to the size of T (Galeotti et al. 
2009). 
 The test statistic tp is an individual t statistic for testing the null hypothesis that 
ρi = 0 for all i; the test is based on averaging individual unit root tests t
− =
1/N ∑ tρi
N
i=1 ,  This statistic is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed (Nell and Zimmerman 
2011). 
 
Breitung’s test 
 The Breitung test is similar the LLC test; however, it does not include 
deterministic terms in the first step (Nell and Zimmerman 2011). 
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Fisher’s test 
 The Fisher-type test is proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999). The test statistic is: 
(A.II.6)  FTT = −2 ∑ lnpi
N
i=1  
 The above test statistic is asymptotically Chi-square distributed with 2N degrees of 
freedom. pi is the asymptotic p-value associated with the test of a unit root for the i
th 
individual. Both the IPS and fisher tests do not require a balanced panel dataset 
(Galeotti 2009). 
 
Cointegration Tests 
 
Pedroni test 
 The Pedroni (1999, 2004) test extends the Engle Granger’s Framework. It is 
based on an examination of the residuals of spurious regressions which are performed 
using I(1) variables. If the variable are cointegrated, then the residuals should be I(0). 
However, if the residuals are not cointegrated, then the residuals should be I(1). 
Consider the following regression: 
(A.II.7)   yit = αi + δit + β1ix1 i,t + β2ix2 i,t + ⋯ . . +βMixM i,t + ei,t 
For t=1,…….T;  I =1,……….,N: m=1………M, the residuals ei,t are assumed to be 
integrated of order one, e.g., I(1). The parameters αi and δi are individual and trend 
effects, respectively. The general approach is to test if the residuals from the above 
equation are I(1) by running auxiliary regressions: 
(A.II.8)   eit = ρieit−1 + uit   
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(A.II.9)    eit = ρizi,t−1 + ∑ ϕijΔei,t−j
pi
j=1 + uit  (Eviews 2010). 
 The cointegration statistics can be divided into two classes; the first class (panel 
statistics) is based on a pooled estimate of ϕi, and the second class of statistics (group 
mean statistics) uses an average of the different ϕi, which is estimated separately for 
each individual. For the panel group of statistics, the alternative hypothesis is that the 
parameters are homogeneous. The group-mean statistics are against heterogeneous 
alternatives (Galeotti 2009). The test statistic is constructed from the residuals of either 
equation A.II.8 or equation A.II.9. It is shown that the statistic is asymptotically 
normally distributed (Eviews 2010). 
 
Kao’s cointegration test 
 The Kao (1999) coinegration test is similar to the Pedroni test. However it 
specifies cross-section specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients on the first 
stage repressors. Equation A.II.7 is run, in this case however the αi′s are required being 
heterogeneous and the βi are assumed to be homogeneous across cross-sections. The 
trend coefficient in equation A.II.7 is assumed to be zero.  
Kao then runs a pooled auxiliary regression: 
(A.II.10)  eit = ρieit−1 + vit 
Or the augmented version: 
(A.II.11)  eit = ρizi,t−1 + ∑ ϕijΔei,t−j
pi
j=1 + vit 
Under the null hypothesis the pooled specification is:  
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(A.II.12)  DFρ =
T√N(ρ^−1)+3√N
√10.2
 
And for p > 0 (i.e., the augmented version) converges to N (0, 1) asymptotically 
(Eviews 2010). 
 
Westerlund cointegration tests 
The Westerlund tests assume the following data-generating processes. These tests are 
based on error correction. 
(A.II.13)  Δyit = δt
′dt+αi(yi,t−1 + βt
′xt,t−1) +∑ αij
pi
j=1 Δyi,t−j 
+∑ Υij
pi
j=−qi
Δxi,t−j 
Where:  
 Y is the dependent variable 
 x is the vector of independent variables 
 dt = (1, t)
′ is the set of deterministic components and  
 Δ is the first difference operator 
 (Westerlund 2007) in (McCarl et al. 2009) 
 Four statistics are calculated; two of these are group statistics and the remainders 
are pooled statistics. Under the group statistics test, the null hypothesis is that αi = 0 is 
tested versus the alternate hypothesis that H1∶ αi < 0 for at least one i. These statistics 
are a weighted average of the individually estimated  αi and their t ratios, respectively. 
The pooled statistics combine information over from each and every cross-sectional 
unit. The null and the alternate hypothesis are αi = 0  αi  < 0, respectively. Rejection of 
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the null hypothesis suggests evidence of cointegration for the panel as a whole 
(Westerlund 2007). 
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APPENDIX III  
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATIONS ESSAY 1 
 
Fixed Effects Estimator  
 The fixed effects model specification utilized by Barbier (2001) to estimate the 
effects of the variables on change in rate of agricultural extent is also utilized here. The 
fixed effects model is represented by the following equation: 
(A.III.1)    yit = Xitβ + i𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 The fixed effects model is also referred to the Least Square Dummy model 
(LSDV) (Greene 1997). This model is a classical regression model, where it is assumed 
that the standard errors are identically distributed. However, in this case the standard 
errors are both heteroskedastic as well as correlated, prompting the use of robust 
standard errors. The Hausman test was employed to check if we should employ random 
effects or fixed effects estimation; the estimates observed under the random effects 
method revealed that the random effects estimators were equal to the OLS estimators, 
therefore the need for including fixed effects within the OLS framework were tested for. 
One of the drawbacks of the fixed effects model specification is that it does not take into 
account the non-stationary nature of the data. Non-stationarity data could lead to 
spurious regressions, necessitating tests for stationarity of the data. 
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Table A.III.1. The Fixed Effects Model with Normal Standard Errors 
 
  Combined 
Latin 
America Asia 
RY -1.56E-07 7.80E-09 -7.26E-08 
 (0.31) (0.97) (0.74) 
WY 2.39E-07 8.45E-07 -2.30E-07 
 (0.17) (0.00) (0.24) 
MY 2.72E-07** 1.85E-07 -9.70E-08 
 (0.04) (0.42) (0.51) 
ARPP -0.0051764 -0.019645 0.009779 
 (0.75) (0.39) (0.67) 
CRPL -0.0070082*** -0.008299 -0.001494 
 (0.00) (0.00)** (0.43) 
PGDP -1.83E-06** -3.35E-06 -1.40E-06 
 (0.03) (0.20) (0.02) 
𝐏𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐒𝟐 2.370E-10 1.09E-09 1.23E-10 
 (0.16) (0.39) (0.27) 
PPGDP -0.0002378 -0.0003585 9.81e-06  
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.96) 
RITR -0.0000342 -0.000565 .0001219 
 (0.93) (0.47) (0.71) 
WATR -0.0003091 -0.000466 -.003656 
 (0.67) (0.59) (0.33) 
MATR -0.0000167 0.000282 .0012414 
 (0.98) (0.68) (0.58) 
PPON 0.003667 0.009482 -.0023905  
  (0.12) (0.02)** (0.23) 
 
Notes: RY- Rice yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per 
hectare in Hg; MY- Maize yield per hectare in Hg; ARPP- Arable land (hectares per person; CRPL -
Permanent cropland (% of land area); PGDP-GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) (centered) data; 
PGDP2 -GDP per capita(constant 2000 US $) squared; PPGDP- GDP per capita growth (annual %); 
PPON- Annual percentage change in population; RITR Rice export value US$ divided by income: 
WHTR- Wheat export value US$ divided by income; MHTR- Maize export value US$ divided by 
income. 
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Table A.III.2. The Fixed Effects Model with Robust Standard Errors 
   Combined model Latin America Asia 
    
RY -1.56E-07 7.80E-09 -7.26E-08 
 (0.34) (0.97) (0.74) 
WY 2.39E-07 8.45E-07 -2.30E-07 
 (0.45) (0.18) (0.32) 
MY 2.72E-07 1.85E-07 -9.70E-08 
 (0.06) (0.21) (0.58) 
ARPP -0.0051764 -0.019645 0.009779 
 (0.80) (0.49) (0.73) 
CRPL -0.0070082*** 0.008296 -0.001494 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.61) 
PGDP -1.83E-06** -3.35E-06 -1.40E-06** 
 (0.03) (0.38) (0.01) 
𝐏𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐒𝟐 2.37E-10*** 1.09E-09 1.23E-10 
 (0.03) (0.25) (0.06) 
PPGDP -0.0002378 -0.000359 9.81e-06  
 (0.30) (0.24) (0.97) 
RITR -0.0000342 -0.00565 .0001219 
 (0.89) (0.30) (0.41) 
WHTR -0.0003091 -0.000470 -.003656 
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.10) 
MATR -0.0000167 0.000282 .0012414 
 (0.96) (0.58) (0.12) 
PPON 0.003667 0.009600 -.0023905  
  (0.22) (0.07) (0.00) 
 
Notes: RY- Rice yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per 
hectare in Hg; MY- Maize yield per hectare in Hg; ARPP- Arable land (hectares per person; CRPL -
Permanent cropland (% of land area); PGDP-GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) (centered) data; 
PGDP2 -GDP per capita(constant 2000 US $) squared; PPGDP- GDP per capita growth (annual %); 
PPON- Annual percentage change in population; RITR Rice export value US$ divided by income: 
WHTR- Wheat export value US$ divided by income; MHTR- Maize export value US$ divided by 
income. 
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The Feasible Generalized Least Squares Model 
 The FGLS method is utilized when the variance covariance matrix is not 
spherical. The variance covariance matrix was found to be heteroskedastic as well as 
correlated. The estimating equation for the feasible generalized least squares is given by 
the following equation: 
(A. III. 2)     (X′Ω−1X)−1X′Ω−1Y      
where the equation for the variance covariance matrix is given by the following 
equation: 
(A. III. 3)    (X′Ω−1X)−1 
 The variance-covariance matrix is not known and is therefore estimated 
by the expression omega hat. The feasible least squares estimator was first applied to 
panel data by Parks (1967). The FGLS method performs well in large samples; it is 
equivalent to full maximum likelihood (Beck and Katz 1995). 
 There have been criticisms of the feasible generalized least squares method in 
the recent past (Beck and Katz 1995). The main criticism was that the feasible 
generalized least squares method tends to underestimate the standard errors of the 
estimators. However the accuracy of the feasible generalized least squares estimator 
increases as the ratio of T/N increases. For both the Latin American and Asian 
specifications of the model, the ratio T/N is greater than 4, and in the case of the 
combined model it is more than 3.  
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Table A.III.3. The Feasible Generalized Least Squares Model 
  Combined Latin America Asia 
DLNRY -.0016001 .0010125 -.0043955 
 (0.63) (0.81) (0.49) 
DLNWY .0024264 .0038064 -.0028174 
 (0.28) (0.15) (0.59) 
DLNMY .001019 .001807 -.0007307 
 (0.66) (0.54) (0.85) 
DLNARPP .1337372*** .0919349*** .3442101 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DLNCRPL .0182918** .0377507** .0121853 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.20) 
DLNPGDP -.0067424 -.0031495  -.0248764 
 (0.47) (0.82) (0.12) 
𝐃𝐋𝐍𝐏𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐒𝟐 -.0000881 -.0000775 -.0002458 
 (0.73) (0.80) (0.62) 
DLNPPGDP -.0024572 -.0017238 .0071609 
 (0.76) (0.88) (0.59) 
DLNRITR -.0063121 .014996 -.017365  
 (0.87) (0.79) (0.74) 
DLNWHTR .0000657 3.28e-06 .0000771 
 (0.73) (0.99) (0.74) 
DLNMATR -.0375934 -.0391795 -.2549412 
 (0.28) (0.30) (0.30) 
DLNPPON .0542309    3076204  .1528653 
  (0.86) (0.69) (0.69) 
 
Notes: RY- Rice yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per hectare in Hg; WY- Wheat yield per 
hectare in Hg; MY- Maize yield per hectare in Hg; ARPP- Arable land (hectares per person; CRPL -
Permanent cropland (% of land area); PGDP-GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) (centered) data; 
PGDP2 -GDP per capita(constant 2000 US $) squared; PPGDP- GDP per capita growth (annual %); 
PPON- Annual percentage change in population; RITR Rice export value US$ divided by income: 
WHTR- Wheat export value US$ divided by income; MHTR- Maize export value US$ divided by 
income. The operator DLN refers to the log and first difference. 
 
 
 174 
 
APPENDIX IV 
LIST OF COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN STERN AND COMMON (2001) 
 (SC DATASET) 
 
OECD 
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA, West Germany. 
 
Non-OECD 
 Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Israel, Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South Africa, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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APPENDIX V 
 IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS AND SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS TESTS 
 
Figures 
 
 
Figure A.V.1.  Impulse Response Function DV Carbon Dioxide Data 
 
 
 
 Figure A.V.2. Impulse Response Function SC Sulfur Dioxide Data 
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Figure A.V.3. Impulse Response Function DV Sulfur Dioxide Data 
 
Skewness and Kurtosis Test 
 
Table A.V.1.   Results of the Skewness and Kurtosis Test 
H0: The Residuals are Normally Distributed (DV Data Carbon) (P Values) 
 Skewness Kurtosis Joint 
GDPres 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Co2res 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.V.2. Results of the Skewness and Kurtosis Test 
H0: The Residuals are Normally Distributed (DV Data Sulfur) (P Values) 
 Skewness Kurtosis Joint 
GDPres 0.000 0.000 0.000 
So2res 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table A.V.3. Results of the Skewness and Kurtosis Test 
H0: The Residuals are Normally Distributed (SC data) (P Values) 
 Skewness Kurtosis Joint 
GDPres 0.000 0.000 0.000 
So2res 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table A.V.4.  Results of the Skewness and Kurtosis Test  
H0: The Variables are Normally Distributed (DV Data Carbon) (P Values) 
 Skewness Kurtosis Joint 
lnGDP 0.000 0.006 0.000 
lnCo2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table A.V.5. Results of the Skewness and Kurtosis Test 
H0: The Variables are Normally Distributed (DV Data Sulfur) (P Values) 
 Skewness Kurtosis Joint 
lnGDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnSo2 0.028 0.000 0.000 
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Table A.V.6.  Results of the Skewness and Kurtosis Test 
H0: The Variables are Normally Distributed (SC Data) (P Values) 
 Skewness Kurtosis Joint 
lnGDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lnSo2 0.016 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Granger Causality Tests 
 
An alternate test of Granger causality is also applied21. These results are based 
on the initial panel models estimated by equation III.17, which are the unrestricted 
models. Assuming the lag length is correctly specified, “the variable X is said not to 
Granger cause the variable Y if the coefficients of X are not significantly different from 
zero” (Al-Iriani 2006). Therefore, a test for the presence of Granger causality is a test of 
the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of X are equal to zero. The test statistic follows 
a chi-square distribution with p degrees of freedom22. 
 The residual sums of squares from both models are calculated; a chi-square test 
is then applied to test for the presence of Granger causality. The results of these Granger 
causality tests are presented in table A.V.7. The lag lengths chosen for these models are 
                                                 
21 Problems with this test are described by Giles 2013; however, this test directly uses the results from the 
PVAR. 
22  A Wald test statistic is computed. The test statistic W=N (rss-uss)/(uss)  ~ 𝜒2 with p degress of 
freedom, where p = the number of lags. 
 179 
 
based on the SBC criterion and are, therefore, identical to the lag lengths chosen for the 
initial panel VAR models presented in table III.9. 
 From table A.V.7 it is apparent that there is a bidirectional causal relationship 
between carbon dioxide emissions and GDP for DV’s dataset. At the one percent level 
of significance, there is a unidirectional causal relationship between emissions and GDP 
per capita, for the sulfur datasets. At the 10 % level of significance we find evidence of 
a bidirectional relationship. 
 
Table A.V.7. Panel Granger Causality Tests (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988) 
Null Hypothesis DV dataset  
carbon 
dioxide 
emission 
DV dataset 
sulfur 
dioxide 
emissions 
SC dataset 
Sulfur 
dioxide 
emissions 
Carbon dioxide  does not Granger 
cause GDP 
20.880***23   
GDP  does not Granger cause carbon 
dioxide 
45.144***   
Sulfur dioxide  does not Granger 
cause GDP 
 3.729* 
 
  10.027* 
GDP  does not Granger causes Sulfur 
dioxide 
 17.753*** 
 
14.066** 
Note:∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
23  The values in table A.V.9 correspond to the W statistic. 
